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WISE UP! WHY IT’S TIME TO DUMP REED V. WISER AND
GET REAL ABOUT THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS
DAVID CLUXTON*

ABSTRACT
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Conventions) are international treaties governing
the liability of the air carrier for damage arising during international carriage by air, e.g., passenger death or bodily injury. The
foundation for the applicability of these Conventions is the contract of carriage. However, given the nature of the air transport
operations and their technological complexity, a given accident
can result from several causes attributable to different parties.
The plaintiff (e.g., the passenger) may have the option of suing,
not only the carrier based on the contract of carriage, but, alternatively, an airframe or component manufacturer, or an aviation service provider (e.g., airport or air traffic service provider),
or even an employee or agent of the air carrier. These alternative defendants are third parties to the contract of carriage; as
such, the Conventions do not apply to these claims. Where a
plaintiff opts to sue a third party to the contract of carriage, that
third party will often bring a third-party action for contribution
or indemnification against the air carrier. The dilemma raised
by such actions is whether the Conventions apply to them. If
not, the risk arises that the provisions of those Conventions
* David Cluxton, B.C.L., LL.M., Ph.D. Having been awarded a Bachelor of
Civil Law (B.C.L.) degree from University College Dublin, Ireland, David worked
for the Irish airline Aer Lingus Ltd. In 2014, he was awarded an LL.M. in Air and
Space Law and subsequently earned a Ph.D. in law for his research on the choice
of forum in international aviation litigation. He is also a former lecturer in
aviation law and policy at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is the author of
AVIATION LAW CAUSE OF ACTION EXCLUSIVITY IN THE WARSAW AND MONTREAL
CONVENTIONS, published by Edward Elgar Publishing in 2022. David would like to
express his sincerest thanks to the editorial team at the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce and recognize their professionalism and hard work, all of which helped
make this Article the best it could be.
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(e.g., monetary limitations of liability) will not apply, although
they would have had the plaintiff to the main action sued the
carrier directly. This would mean that the Conventions may be
effectively circumvented and their purposes defeated.
There is judicial division on the matter, both within the
United States and internationally. This Article aims to identify
and critically evaluate the doctrinal foundations of the competing arguments for and against the applicability of the Conventions to third-party actions and to establish which is doctrinally
correct. It starts by examining how courts (and the international
community) have treated the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to actions brought against employees and agents of the
air carrier. Attention then turns to the related matter of the applicability of the Conventions to third-party actions for contribution or indemnification taken against air carriers; it identifies
two distinct approaches taken by courts: the orthodox approach
and the alternative approach. The thesis of this Article is that
the favoring by U.S. courts of the alternative approach is the
result of a doctrinal misstep traceable to the Second Circuit’s
decision in Reed v. Wiser. This Article exposes the weakness of
the Second Circuit’s reasoning and reveals the true policy justifications for the decision. This Article proves that these policies,
although compelling at the time, no longer hold water and that,
instead, the more doctrinally sound doctrine of the orthodox
approach should be followed—a conclusion supported by recent decisions of some U.S. courts, as well as decisions from Australia and the United Kingdom. Although this would give rise to
some invidious problems, this Article argues that only by freeing
ourselves of the baneful influence of Reed v. Wiser and thereby
setting ourselves back on a sound doctrinal footing can we hope
to get real about third-party actions and find a solution to the
problems posed by them.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF WCS TO THIRD-PARTY
ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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INTRODUCTION

O

N MAY 2, 2006, ARMAVIA AIRLINES (Armavia) Flight 967
was flying at night over the Black Sea close to its destination of Sochi, Russia, having earlier departed from Yerevan in
Armenia.1 The aircraft was an Airbus A320, registered in Armenia, operated by an Armenian airline, but owned by a Cayman
Islands legal entity.2 The flight crew decided earlier in the flight
to return to Yerevan because of poor weather conditions that
were causing low visibility at Sochi, but they changed their mind
upon receiving an updated weather report.3 However, on approach to land at Sochi, the visibility dropped below established
minima, and the controller instructed the crew to abandon the
landing and ascend to 600 meters.4 In attempting to perform
the climbing-out maneuver, the aircraft collided with the water,
killing all 113 people on board.5
The Air Accident Investigation Commission of the Interstate
Aviation Committee (IAC) conducted an accident investigation.6 While not produced for the purpose of apportioning
For an account of the facts, see INTERSTATE AVIATION COMM., AIR ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACCIDENT
INVOLVING THE ARMAVIA A320 NEAR SOCHI AIRPORT ON 3 MAY 2006, at 7–8 (2006)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT: ARMAVIA], https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2006/ek9060502/pdf/ek-9060502.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNV2-E8NK].
2 Id. at 10–11.
3 Id. at 7.
4 Id. at 7–8.
5 Id. at 8.
6 The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) is an executive body established
under a treaty between twelve States and whose responsibilities include accident
investigation. Id. at 2, 6; About IAC: Interstate Aviation Committee, INTERSTATE
AVIATION COMM., https://mak-iac.org/en/o-mak/ [https://perma.cc/9SRQ-HA
MH]. The current membership of the IAC includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Be1
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blame or liability, the IAC accident report noted several shortcomings with the crew’s performance and the airline’s management.7 It is worthwhile noting that the report addressed several
recommendations to the aircraft manufacturer, Airbus.8
As a qualifying international flight, the liability of the airline
for the carriage of passengers by air came under the terms of an
international treaty from 1929, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
better known as the Warsaw Convention.9 It may be surprising
that a convention from 1929 should govern an accident occurring in 2006, especially since a successor convention had been
concluded in 1999, i.e., the Montreal Convention 1999
(MC99).10 However, at the time of the accident, neither the Russian Federation nor Armenia was party to MC99, but they were
both signatories to the Warsaw Convention, and hence it was the
applicable instrument.
While the Warsaw Convention operates on the basis of a presumption of fault of the carrier,11 it has a notoriously low monetary limitation on liability for passenger death and injury
larus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Member Countries of Agreement, INTERSTATE
AVIATION COMM., https://mak-iac.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/FDW4-U7ME].
7 See FINAL REPORT: ARMAVIA, supra note 1, at 52–53.
8 The text reads,
To Airbus:
– To eliminate the discrepancies in the documentation describing
the logic of the binary signals recorded by the FDR.
– To introduce in the A320 FCOM information clarifying specific
features of activation of the OPEN CLIMB mode in various flight
conditions.
– To introduce in the A320 FCOM a warning about possible activation of the LOW ENERGY WARNING, when the aircraft performs
manoeuvres in the landing configuration with considerable
changes in pitch and roll angles.
– To review the expediency of alteration of the type and/or priority
of the EGPWS warning to ensure more reliable pilots’ response to
its activation.
Id. at 55.
9 See generally Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
10 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,083, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter
MC99].
11 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 17.
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claims—it provides only 125,000 Franc Poincaré,12 equivalent in
1934 to approximately U.S. $8,300.13 This figure was doubled in
1955 by the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention,14 rising
to 250,000 Franc Poincaré, equivalent to approximately
U.S. $16,600.15 However, this higher—although still woefully inadequate—limit is only applicable where the flight in question is
between States that have both ratified the Hague Protocol.16 At
the time of Armavia Flight 967, Russia had ratified the Hague
Protocol, but Armenia had not;17 hence, only the unamended
Warsaw Convention applied.
The Warsaw Convention’s monetary limitations can only be
broken in exceptional circumstances, e.g., where the plaintiff
can prove the carrier was guilty of willful misconduct.18 Thus, in
the Armavia case, the plaintiffs would likely have struggled to
recover in excess of the Warsaw limits. Nevertheless, Armavia’s
insurers agreed to settle passenger claims based on the limits
provided under the Hague Protocol.19 Those passengers who
chose to settle on these terms acknowledged their full indemnification and released the airline and Airbus from any future
claims.20 However, some plaintiffs elected not to settle and instead brought proceedings in products liability against Airbus
12 Id. art. 22(4). The Franc Poincaré was named after French Prime Minister
Raymond Poincaré and is a unit of account (originally identical to the French
franc) defined as 65.5 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. See id. For a short account of the conversion of the monetary
limitations of the Warsaw Convention and subsequent instruments in that system,
see LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 123–25 (2d ed. 2000).
13 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 12, at 125.
14 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, art. XI, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 373
[hereinafter Hague Protocol].
15 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 12, at 124.
16 See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307–10 (2d Cir.
2000).
17 Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Contracting Parties to the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw
on 12 October 1929 and the Protocol Modifying the Said Convention Signed at the Hague
on 28 September 1955, https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Par
ties/WC-HP_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC9Z-TDTN].
18 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 25(1).
19 P.M.J. Mendes de Leon, Jurisdiction Under and Exclusivity of Private International Air Law Agreements on Air Carrier Liability: The Case of Airbus versus Armavia
Airlines (2013), in FROM LOWLANDS TO HIGH SKIES – A MULTILEVEL JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TOWARDS AIR LAW 261, 263 (P.M.J. Mendes de Leon ed., 2013).
20 Id.
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before the courts of Toulouse, France.21 From the plaintiffs’ perspective, a claim against Airbus was preferable in the circumstances because it provided the possibility of recovering under
broad heads of damage without the monetary limits of the Warsaw Convention.22 In addition, a products liability claim against
Airbus would permit the plaintiffs to sue in France, as opposed
to being restricted to sue in either Russia or Armenia by the
jurisdictional scheme of the Warsaw Convention.23
Airbus sought to join Armavia to the litigation brought against
it in France by bringing a third-party action against the airline
for indemnification.24 Armavia challenged the jurisdiction of
the French court, essentially arguing that Armavia could not be
made a party to the litigation of passengers’ claims before the
court of a jurisdiction not provided for under the Warsaw Convention.25 Airbus maintained the view that the Warsaw Convention applied only to claims between the airline and passengers,
21 Laurent Chassot, Le Domaine de la Responsabilité du Transporteur Aérien International à la Lumière de Deux Décisions Récentes [The Field of the Liability of the International Air Carrier in Light of Two Recent Decisions], 227 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE
DROIT AÉRIEN ET SPATIAL [R.F.D.A.S.] 5, 22 (2016) (Fr.).
22 Id.
23 See id. The Warsaw Convention prescribes the places in whose courts an action under the Warsaw Convention can be taken. Warsaw Convention, supra note
9, art. 28(1) (“An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
Court having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by which the contract has been
made or before the Court having jurisdiction at the place of destination.”).
24 This action was tort-based. See Mendes de Leon, supra note 19, at 265. Airbus
apparently did not have a contractual indemnity from Armavia. Id. It is not clear
why Airbus did not seek to rely upon the contractual indemnity it had from the
purchaser of the aircraft. In some cases, such a situation may arise where the
same insurer covers the purchaser and manufacturer, thus being in their interest
to transfer some liability to a different insurer. For some discussion on the strategies employed by defendants via third-party actions, see David Cluxton, Choice of
Forum in Passenger Claims Under the Montreal Convention 1999: A Two-Dimensional
Solution to a Three-Dimensional Problem, 49 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
25 Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Toulouse, 4e ch., civ., May 31, 2011, 08/01762 (Fr.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, civ., Mar. 12, 2013, 11/03207 (Fr.); see also
Chassot, supra note 21, at 22. France was not one of the four jurisdictions available under the Warsaw Convention. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art.
28(1). Armavia’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business were
Yerevan, Armenia. Armavia Airlines, SKYBRARY, https://skybrary.aero/operator/
armavia-airlines [https://perma.cc/NH76-K2UR]. The place of contract through
which the contract would have been made was, in most cases, Armenia; in no case
was it in France. The place of destination was dependent on the ticket of the

2022]

WISE UP!

9

that it did not apply to its third-party action against the carrier,
and as such, that the French courts had jurisdiction under national law.26
In essence, Armavia was imploring the courts not to allow
Airbus to separate the third-party action from the underlying
passenger tort action against the carrier. In so doing, Armavia
maintained that the former was derivative of the latter. Furthermore, Armavia argued that if it were added to the litigation as a
third-party defendant, then the plaintiffs would effectively be
able to circumvent the application of the Warsaw Convention.27
How so? Because the plaintiffs would indirectly establish jurisdiction over Armavia before the courts of France with the possibility being that if the result of the litigation were that Armavia
had to indemnify Airbus, then the carrier would be made liable
to the passenger (albeit indirectly) in a manner not in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.28 It was
submitted that this would be contrary to the express language of
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that “any
action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention.”29
The implication being that the plaintiffs were taking advantage
passenger in question, but in most cases, it would have been either Sochi or Yerevan. See FINAL REPORT: ARMAVIA, supra note 1, at 6.
26 See Mendes de Leon, supra note 19, at 264. The French court’s jurisdiction
was founded on Article 333 of the Code de Procédure Civile, which provides: “Le
tiers mis en cause est tenu de procéder devant la juridiction saisie de la demande originaire,
sans qu’il puisse décliner la compétence territoriale de cette juridiction, même en invoquant
une clause attributive de compétence.” [The third party summoned is bound to act
before the court to which the original claim is brought without being able to
challenge the territorial jurisdiction of the court even by relying upon a jurisdiction clause.] Code de procédure civile [C.P.C.] [Civil Procedure Code] art. 333
(Fr.).
27 See Mendes de Leon, supra note 19, at 266.
28 See id.
29 Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 24; see Mendes de Leon, supra note 19,
at 272 (“Airbus did not exercise a personal cause of action against Armavia Airlines as its claim for indemnification is designed to involve the liability of the
airline with the damages caused to the passengers. Indeed, neither Article 24—as
to which see the words ‘however founded’—nor Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention distinguish between the causes of action pursuant to which the passenger
or their relatives make claims for damages engaging the liability of the air carrier.
Hence, the convention applies to all claims made against the carrier, whoever the
claimant is and whatever cause of action it chooses for its claim.”). Mendes de
Leon submitted an affidavit to the French courts in support of Armavia Airlines
and is not, therefore, an entirely disinterested party. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, civ., Mar. 12, 2013, 11/03207 (Fr.).
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of a procedural loophole to deprive the carrier of the protections accorded it under the Warsaw Convention.
Armavia was successful at first instance and also on appeal.30
These courts considered Airbus’s third-party action as an attempt to engage the liability of the carrier for damages caused
to passengers.31 The Toulouse Court of Appeal claimed that,
contrary to Airbus’s argument, Airbus does “not exercise a personal right of action against Armavia Airlines since its recourse
in warranty aims to engage the liability of Armavia Airlines, an
air carrier, for the damage caused to passengers.”32 In essence,
these courts read the Warsaw Convention as making no distinction between the capacity in which a carrier may be sued or the
identity of the party suing, and therefore, the Warsaw Convention must be regarded as governing all claims against a carrier.33
30 Chassot, supra note 21, at 22–23; see Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Toulouse, 4e ch., civ., May 31, 2011, 08/
01762 (Fr.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, civ., Mar.
12, 2013, 11/03207 (Fr.).
31 Some commentary and extracts of the initial decisions can be found in Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Toulouse, 4e ch. civ., May 31, 2011, 08/01762 (Fr.) and Cour d’appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Toulouse, civ., Mar. 12, 2013, 11/03207 (Fr.). See also Mendes de
Leon, supra note 19, at 272. The Toulouse Court of Appeal also supported its
decision by reference to the purpose of the Warsaw Convention as achieving uniformity of law. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, civ., Mar.
12, 2013, 11/03207 (Fr.) (“Enfin l’objet de la convention de Varsovie (pour l’unification
de certaines règles relatives au transport aérien international) était notamment de formuler
une règle internationale uniforme en matière de compétence juridictionnelle.” [Finally, the
purpose of the Warsaw Convention (for the unification of certain rules relating
to international air transport) was, among other things, to formulate a uniform
international rule on the matter of jurisdiction.]).
32 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, civ., Mar. 12, 2013,
11/03207 (Fr.) (“Cependant, contrairement à ce que la SAS AIRBUS prétend, elle
n’exerce pas un droit d’action personnel à l’encontre de la Compagnie Armavia Airlines
puisque son recours en garantie vise à engager la responsabilité de la Compagnie Armavia
Airlines, transporteur aérien, pour les dommages causés aux passagers.” [Nevertheless,
contrary to what Airbus SAS claims, it does not exercise a personal right of action
against Armavia Airlines since its recourse in warranty aims to engage the liability
of Armavia Airlines, an air carrier, for damage caused to passengers]).
33 The Toulouse Court of Appeal held:
Or ni l’article 24 ni l’article 28 [de la Convention de Varsovie] ne font de
distinction selon le titre auquel le transporteur aeérien se trouve assigneé ni
selon la personne qui recherche la responsabiliteé du transporteur.
Il y a lieu dès lors de considérer que les dispositions de la convention doivent
reégir toute action contre le transporteur, quelles que soient les personnes qui
mettent en cause cette responsabiliteé et le titre auquel elles preétendent agir.
[However, neither Article 24 nor Article 28 [of the Warsaw Convention] makes a distinction according to the capacity in which the air
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However, Airbus appealed to the Cour de Cassation (the supreme
court for judicial matters in France).
Parsimonious as ever, the judgment of the Cour de Cassation
reads: “Attendu que l’appel en garantie du constructeur
d’aéronefs contre le transporteur aérien ne relève pas du champ
d’application de la Convention de Varsovie et, partant, échappe
aux règles de compétence juridictionnelle posées en son article
28.” [Whereas the warranty claim by the aircraft manufacturer
against the air carrier does not fall within the scope of the Warsaw Convention and, therefore, falls outside the jurisdictional
rules laid down in its Article 28.]34 In essence, the Cour de Cassation held that the Warsaw Convention’s jurisdictional provisions did not apply to the third-party action.35 Consequently,
Armavia could not contest the jurisdiction of the French courts
to hear Airbus’s third-party action.36 As is so often the case in
international aviation litigation, resolution of the choice of forum was likely outcome-determinative in the Armavia case.
Once it was clear that the jurisdiction of the French courts could
not be disturbed, it is likely that Armavia—in reality, its insurers—opted to settle at that point.
This issue is not limited to the Warsaw Convention; it also
arose in litigation taken under MC99. In re Air Crash Over the
Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, concerned claims brought by the
representatives of decedent passengers of Air France Flight
447.37 The majority of the plaintiffs were non-U.S. domiciliaries,
for whom jurisdiction against the airline did not exist in the
United States.38 Instead, these plaintiffs brought tort actions in
U.S. courts against several U.S. component manufacturers, and
these actions were consolidated before the District Court for the
Central District of California.39 The defendant manufacturers
carrier may be sued, nor according to the person who seeks the
liability of the carrier.
It should therefore be considered that the provisions of the Convention must govern any action against the carrier, regardless of
the persons who maintain the action for liability and the capacity in
which they claim to act.].
Id.
34 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar.
4, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 48 (Fr.).
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 760 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
38 See id. at 836.
39 See id. at 841.
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brought third-party actions against Air France for indemnification or contribution.40 In considering a motion to dismiss the
case on the grounds of forum non conveniens (FNC), the court
noted that a potential tension with MC99 would arise if it held
that MC99 did not cover the third-party claims against the carrier.41 The cause of this potential tension was twofold: first, the
airline would not be presumptively liable to the plaintiffs, as
contemplated by MC99; second, it would undermine the jurisdictional provisions of MC99 by forcing Air France to indirectly
answer the passengers’ claims in a forum not provided by the
Warsaw Convention.42 The court determined that an FNC dismissal could avoid this “tension.”43 Therefore, the court did not
have to rule on the applicability of MC99 to third-party actions.
However, other U.S. courts have reached decisions on this question, and those decisions are not all of one voice. Most have held
that the Warsaw Convention or MC99 does apply, but a smaller
number have concluded that it does not.44 When we add to the
mix that the courts of Canada and Australia have reached the
view that the Warsaw Convention or MC99 do not apply to thirdparty actions,45 we can see the lack of uniformity posed in such a
state of affairs—something one would think is inimical to conventions whose very titles refer to the unification of certain
rules.
This Article aims to identify and critically evaluate the doctrinal foundations of the competing arguments for and against the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention and MC99 to third-party
actions and to establish which is doctrinally correct.
A.

OVERVIEW

Including this Introduction, this Article is divided into four
parts. Part II begins by tackling the question of the applicability
of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions. The Warsaw
Convention was agreed upon in 1929 and was subsequently the
subject of various amending protocols, a supplementary convenId. at 844–45, 847.
Id. at 846–47.
42 Id.
43 An FNC dismissal would avoid this tension because jurisdiction would exist
against Air France in France for all claims. Id. at 846 (“This avoids potential tension with the MC created by the Manufacturing Defendants’ attempts to sue Air
France as a third-party Defendant in the foreign Plaintiffs’ actions.”).
44 See cases discussed infra Sections II.B, III.A.
45 See cases discussed infra Sections II.B, III.A.
40
41
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tion, and various inter-carrier agreements—all collectively referred to as the Warsaw Convention System (WCS).46 Although
WCS has now been modernized and consolidated by MC99, attention to the predecessor system is essential for at least two reasons. First, it remains in force, as exemplified by the Armavia
case. Second, although MC99 is a new treaty neither supplemental to nor an amendment of WCS, there is a great deal of commonality between them. Many of MC99’s provisions were taken
with little or no alteration from WCS. It is clear that the drafters
intended to hold onto the valuable jurisprudence built up
around WCS and where the texts are “substantively the same,
courts rely upon WCS jurisprudence to interpret MC99.”47 The
provisions of MC99 relevant to the issues explored in this Article
46 The term Warsaw Convention System (WCS) refers to the general body of
instruments built around the Warsaw Convention, including the following: Warsaw Convention, supra note 9; Hague Protocol, supra note 14; Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the
Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Guadalajara
Convention]; Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, as Amended, Mar. 8, 1971, 10
I.L.M. 613 [hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol]; Additional Protocol No. 1 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 2097 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter MAP1]; Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 2097 U.N.T.S. 64
[hereinafter MAP2]; Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25,
1975, ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter MAP3]; Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 2145 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter MAP4]. WCS also
includes several intercarrier agreements, including the Montreal Agreement of
1966 and the IATA inter-carrier agreements of 1992–1995; the text of these and
others is available in Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n [IATA], Essential Documents on International Air Carrier Liability (3d ed. 2012).
47 DAVID CLUXTON, AVIATION LAW CAUSE OF ACTION EXCLUSIVITY IN THE WARSAW AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS 132–33 (2022) (citing Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Although the Convention
‘unifie[d] and replace[d] the system of liability that derives’ from its predecessor,
the Warsaw Convention, the Convention still retains many of its original provisions and terms and thus courts have continued to rely on cases interpreting
equivalent provisions in the Warsaw Convention.”); Baah v. Virgin Atl. Airways
Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]his Court has previously relied on cases interpreting a provision of the Warsaw Convention where the
equivalent provision in the Montreal Convention was substantively the same.”);
Thibodeau v. Air Can., [2014] 3 S.C.R. 340, para. 31 (Can.) (“The purposes of
the Warsaw Convention and of the Montreal Convention were the same and decisions and commentary respecting the Warsaw Convention are therefore helpful in
understanding those purposes.”).
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are no exception; they too are consolidated from WCS. For
these reasons, the emphasis placed on the applicability of the
Warsaw Convention to third-party actions in Part II is entirely
justified.
To determine what place, if any, third-party actions have
within WCS and MC99, Part II begins by looking at the question
of the applicability of these regimes to actions brought against
agents, servants, employees, etc. of the carrier, whom we shall
hereinafter refer to as préposés—for reasons explained below.
Such actions are actions against third parties, insofar as the defendant is a third party vis-à-vis the contract of carriage between
the passenger and carrier. The distinction involved here is critical. When a passenger sues the agent of the carrier, they are
suing a third party, although it is not a third-party action. However, a third-party action may well arise from such litigation, e.g.,
where the third party (to the contract of carriage) decides to
seek contribution or indemnification from a third party (to the
main action), e.g., the carrier.
We begin with the question of the applicability of WCS to actions against a carrier’s préposé because it was in the context of
these that the issue of third-party actions first arose. Another
reason for starting with actions taken against a carrier’s préposés
is because this was the specific issue at play in the case of Reed v.
Wiser, the study of which is key to this Article. In that case, opposing views were reached on this matter by the trial court in
Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev’d 555 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (Reed I) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1977), rev’g 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Reed II).
Actions against préposés posed a problem for the Warsaw Convention. Simply put, if a plaintiff sues a préposé, instead of the
carrier, then in all likelihood the préposé will bring a third-party
action against the carrier. The problem raised by such actions
was that if the Warsaw Convention was not applied to actions
against the préposé, then the plaintiff could effectively circumvent the Warsaw Convention’s provisions, including its monetary
limitations. In order to avoid undermining the goals of the Warsaw Convention, this préposé problem necessitated action, and
the responses taken by the international community, on the one
hand, and by the U.S. courts, on the other hand, are presented
in the first two subsections of Section II.A. The third subsection
of Section II.A is subsidiary in purpose; it provides a brief sum-
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mary of the position adopted under MC99 with respect to actions taken against préposés.
With the background issue of the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention to préposés presented, Section II.B directly addresses
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions. It describes two approaches to the issue: the orthodox approach that maintains that the Warsaw Convention does not apply
to third-party actions, and the alternative approach that holds
the opposite, i.e., that the Warsaw Convention applies to thirdparty actions. Greater attention is devoted to the latter approach, as it has predominantly been the approach adopted by
U.S. courts. This Article’s thesis is that the alternative approach
is predicated on the rationale established by the Second Circuit
in Reed II. This Article conducts a thorough critique of the U.S.
case law, with special attention being paid to one case in particular which attempted to buck the trend (i.e., Mitchell, Shackleton
& Co. v. Air Express International, Inc.).48 Thereafter, two outlier
decisions of two U.S. District Courts are analyzed; they are described as outliers because they clearly do not fit within the alternative approach, but neither can they simply be subsumed
within the orthodox approach; aspects of these decisions require bespoke attention be paid to them, and this is provided in
Section II.B.3. These two cases also merit separate attention because they demonstrate that the U.S. courts are not of one mind
on the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to third-party
actions.
Part III turns attention to MC99 and the question of its applicability to third-party actions. To begin, the U.S. courts went
with the flow and continued to apply the alternative approach
that they had applied to the majority of Warsaw Convention
cases. Indeed, this was the position adopted by the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California in Chubb Insurance
Co. of Europe S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc.49 (Chubb I).
However, the proverbial cat would be set amongst the pigeons
in 2011 when Chubb I reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.50 Section III.A examines the Chubb case closely,
especially the Ninth Circuit’s decision to reverse the U.S. courts’
704 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
No. CV 06-7267, 2008 WL 11357925 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d
1023 (9th Cir. 2011).
50 Chubb Ins. Co. of Eur. S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (Chubb II),
634 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’g No. CV 06-7267, 2008 WL 11357925 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 14, 2008).
48
49
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long-held commitment to the alternative approach to thirdparty actions. It is no secret that the Author views the Ninth Circuit’s position to be the correct one, however, there are a number of critical observations and caveats that must be made in
respect of the decision. In this context, reference will be made
to a 2012 decision of the Court of Appeal for New South Wales,
Australia, in the case of United Airlines Inc v Sercel Australia Pty
Ltd.51 This case provides additional support for the correctness
of the Ninth Circuit’s approach. In addition, although not yet
the subject of a judicial decision in the United Kingdom (U.K.),
we might divine something of how the U.K. courts would treat
the question of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention and
MC99 to third-party actions by examining how the English
Court of Appeal dealt with that question in the context of a very
similar convention, i.e., the Athens Convention Relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea,52 in the case
of Feest v. South West Strategic Health Authority.53
Part IV of this Article summarizes the analysis conducted in
this Article and present its conclusions on the question of the
applicability of WCS and MC99 to third-party actions. In so doing, it will be necessary to engage with some policy considerations. However, the Author wishes to stress that this Article’s
goal is to reveal and critically assess the doctrinal issues at play
and, only where it is expedient to do so, to broach questions of
policy. In other words, the concern herein is determining if
WCS or MC99 applies to third-party actions, not whether they
should apply.

[2012] NSWCA 24 (Austl.).
Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Athens Convention].
53 [2015] EWCA (Civ) 708 [15]–[21], [2016] QB 503 (Eng.).
51
52
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THE APPLICABILITY OF WCS TO THIRD-PARTY
ACTIONS
THE PRÉPOSÉ PROBLEM

A.
54

Both common law and civil law55 systems provide for vicarious liability of the master for their auxiliary.56 But, one impor54 John Salmond stated in his work Jurisprudence: “In general only those acts of
the agent are imputed by the law to the principal, which are within the limits of
the agent’s authority as thus created and circumscribed.” JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 332 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947). However, vicarious liability can also arise without authorization (whether express or implied) and even
where the master has expressly forbidden the wrongful act. See id. at 413. The
principle of vicarious liability is often identified with the Latin maxim qui facit per
alium facit per se, or by its simpler cognate, respondeat superior. See id. at 414.
Whatever one calls it, the principle (at least for present purposes) was described
in plain terms by Salmond: “[M]asters are responsible for the acts of their servants done in the course of their employment.” Id. at 413. Regarding the justification for vicarious liability, see generally Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28
TUL. L. REV. 161 (1954). See also Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26
YALE L.J. 105, 120–21 (1916).
55 The generalized civilian law position is that the master is liable for the acts
or omissions the préposé committed within the scope of the préposé’s employment.
The civil law approach to vicarious liability can be illustrated by the use of the
French Civil Code (first promulgated in 1804). Article 1242 (formerly Article
1384) of the French Civil Code is of specific relevance since it contemplates the
circumstances in which a person may be held liable for the acts of another. CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1242 (Fr.). The first paragraph (alinéa) of Article
1242 provides: “On est responsable non seulement du dommage que l’on cause par son
propre fait, mais encore de celui qui est causé par le fait des personnes dont on doit répondre, ou des choses que l’on a sous sa garde.” [One is liable not only for the harm which
one causes by one’s own action, but also for that which is caused by the action of
persons for whom one is responsible, or of things which one has in one’s keeping.] CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1242 (Fr.), translated in French Civil
Code 2016, TRANS-LEX (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.trans-lex.org/601101/_/
french-civil-code-2016/ [https://perma.cc/PG5X-R34U]. Some specific instances
are then provided. The fifth paragraph of Article 1242 is of particular note in the
present context: “Les maı̂tres et les commettants, du dommage causé par leurs domestiques et préposés dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employés.” [Masters and employers, for harm caused by their servants [domestiques] and employees [préposés]
within the functions for which they employed them.] Id. This is a form of strict
liability of the master for the negligence of the master’s domestiques and préposés,
i.e., vicarious liability. Under French law, the préposé is only open to personal
liability to the injured party in delict (i.e., because of the préposé’s wrongful conduct or lack of action) in accordance with Articles 1240 and 1241 (formerly Articles 1382 and 1383) of the French Civil Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE]
arts. 1240, 1241 (Fr.). To hold the master vicariously liable, it is thus necessary
that the plaintiff prove the fault of the préposé. See id. arts. 1240–42.
56 The term auxiliary is used only as a means of collectively referring to agents,
employees, servants, contractors, préposés, etc. It is not intended to convey a specific juridical meaning. See RENÉ H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER 45 (1981).
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tant distinction between the two systems has created some
controversy within the context of WCS. The authentic French
text of the Warsaw Convention employs the term préposé, translated as agent in the U.S. and U.K. translations of the Warsaw
Convention,57 and as servant and agent in the Hague Protocol.58
However, neither of the English translations are adequate to describe the full meaning of the term préposé. The general position
in civilian legal systems is that a préposé may be an independent
contractor,59 whereas “vicarious liability in English law does not
generally extend to the acts of independent contractors.”60 Préposé is thus a broader concept than the common law one of servant or agent.61 In light of this divergence, and because French
is the only authentic version of the Warsaw Convention, the
term préposé shall be used throughout this Article.
Inevitably, doubt arose as to whether the provisions of the unamended Warsaw Convention applied to an action brought by a
passenger against a carrier’s préposé, as opposed to directly
against the carrier. While the Warsaw Convention does refer to
préposés on several occasions, it is always in the context of the
liability of the carrier.62 The Warsaw Convention does not address itself to the question of the personal liability of préposés.
Aside from being of academic concern, this lacuna was exploited by plaintiff lawyers as a means of attempting to avoid the
Warsaw Convention’s provisions. The theory was that if the Warsaw Convention does not cover such actions, then an action
against a préposé could be brought under le droit commun, free
from the restrictions of the Warsaw Convention.63 The advantages of such would be that it may allow for a forum not speciSee, e.g., Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 20.
See, e.g., Hague Protocol, supra note 14, art. XIV.
59 See MANKIEWICZ, supra note 56, at 45 (“According to legal doctrine and case
law in civil law countries, the ‘préposé’ may be an employee of the carrier or an
independent carrier.”). See also id. at 45–46 (“[T]he carrier is liable for the acts
and omissions of [its préposé] whether he be an employee or is considered to be
an independent contractor who is acting for the carrier, according to general or
specific instructions i.e. ‘within the scope of his employment’, in the performance
of the contract of carriage.”).
60 SALMOND, supra note 54, at 414 n.(k). See generally James, supra note 54, at
193–207.
61 Rene H. Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Conventions: The Warsaw Convention’s Days in Court, 21 INT’L & COMP L.Q. 718, 740
(1972); see also H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
159 (1954).
62 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, arts. 16(1), 20(1), 20(2), 25(2).
63 See, e.g., Chassot, supra note 21, at 5, 23.
57
58
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fied under Article 28, a more generous period of limitation for
bringing an action, or, most importantly, it might yield unlimited liability without having to prove willful misconduct. Aside
from the obvious inequity involved in a préposé facing unlimited
liability while their employer could limit its liability, the more
pernicious effect of this strategy was that it was the carrier who
would eventually end up paying the bill for its préposé’s liability.64
This would arise either out of practical necessity or some legal
duty, e.g., from an indemnity given by the carrier to the préposé
in the employment contract or by means of a right to contribution or indemnification (non-contractual) of préposé against the
carrier. This Article will return to the distinction between contractual and non-contractual forms in its conclusion.
That the carrier could end up footing the bill for its préposés’
personal liability toward a passenger without being able to rely
on the provisions of the Warsaw Convention was viewed as a
loophole by carriers, who argued that it led to the circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s rules.65 The risk of circumvention of the Warsaw Convention posed by contribution and
indemnification actions raised two critical questions. Does the
Warsaw Convention apply to actions brought by plaintiffs
against préposés? If not, does the Warsaw Convention apply to
claims brought by préposés against the carrier?
The Warsaw Convention embodies a basic rule by which the
carrier is prima facie liable for the acts and omissions of its préposés.66 At no point does the unamended Warsaw Convention
See, e.g., id. at 5.
See, e.g., Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Should employees not
be covered by the provisions of the Convention, the entire character of international air disaster litigation involving planes owned and operated by American
airlines, would be radically changed. The liability limitations of the Convention
could then be circumvented by the simple device of a suit against the pilot and/
or other employees, which would force the American employer, if it had not
already done so, to provide indemnity for higher recoveries as the price for service by employees who are essential to the continued operation of its airline.”).
66 This is nowhere explicitly stated but is clearly envisaged by the Warsaw Convention’s regime of presumed fault. Articles 17, 18, and 19 all impose liability on
the carrier for damage arising from certain events during qualifying carriage by
air. Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, arts. 17–19. In other words, there is a presumption of liability on the carrier in the event of such damage. Those articles do
not require that it be proved that the carrier caused the damage—issues of causation only emerge in the provisions providing for exoneration. See id. For instance,
under Article 16, a shipper who fails to supply the necessary documentation and
information for customs and other purposes must bear liability for any damage
resulting therefrom unless the damage is due to the fault of the carrier or the
carrier’s agents (i.e., préposés). See id. art. 16. Clearly, the carrier can be liable even
64
65
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address the personal liability of the préposé. The drafting history
and background to the Warsaw Convention demonstrate that
the drafters’ exclusive focus was on the liability of the carrier;
the drafters were not at all concerned with the personal liability
of préposés or any third party.67 In fact, the only liability angle
concerning préposés contained in the Warsaw Convention is the
liability of the carrier for the acts of its préposés, i.e., vicarious liability.68 On the face of it, this means that actions brought by
passengers/shippers against préposés fall outside the Convention
and are thus governed by le droit commun, thereby creating the
so-called loophole by which the carrier, via the préposé, can be
exposed to liability outside the terms of the Warsaw Convention.
Faced with this dilemma, two alternative responses were
taken. The first was to accept that this loophole existed and
close it by amending the Warsaw Convention. This was the response taken by the international community at the Hague Conference in 1955.69 The second response, adopted by the U.S.
courts, was to interpret the unamended Warsaw Convention in
such a way as to prevent the loophole from arising in the first
place.
1.

The Hague Protocol

In 1955, at The Hague, the reality was acknowledged that the
indemnification of préposés by the carrier meant that an action
taken directly against a préposé could subsequently result in cirwhen it is personally blameless, where the fault lies solely with its préposé. See id.
The same conclusion can be reached from the other three Articles.
67 The report (prepared by Henri de Vos in the name of the Comité International Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aériens (CITEJA)) to the Warsaw Conference
on the draft convention submitted to the Conference stated:
Before examining the articles of the preliminary draft, it is important to bring out that in this matter an international agreement can
only be reached if it is limited to certain determined problems. The
text applies, therefore, only to the contract of carriage in its formal
appearances first of all, and in the legal relationships which arise
between the carrier and the persons carried or the people who
ship. It regulates no other question that transport operations could
give rise to.
SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, OCT. 4–12,
1929, WARSAW: MINUTES 246 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975)
[hereinafter WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH]; see Hague Protocol, supra note 14, at
373.
68 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, arts. 17–30.
69 See Hague Protocol, supra note 14, art. XIV.
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cumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s limits of liability.70 The
solution adopted by the Conference was the adoption of the
Hague Protocol, the effect of which was to amend the Warsaw
Convention to include a new provision (i.e., Article 25A) that
extends the limits of liability to préposés of the carrier.71 It must
be noted that only the monetary limitation of liability is extended to préposés, in all other respects, e.g., conditions of liability, the Warsaw Convention remains inapplicable to the action
against the carrier’s préposé.72 This changed with MC99.73
One might imagine the mere fact that the international community took the step in 1955 to amend the Warsaw Convention
is proof positive of the recognition of a gap in the Warsaw Convention and an acknowledgment that its original text did not
extend to préposés. In fact, only Antonio Ambrosini, as Delegate
of Italy at the Hague Conference in 1955, voiced any view to the
70 At the Hague Conference, the delegate from Mexico “pointed out that
many plaintiffs tried to obtain compensation in excess of that provided by the
[Warsaw] Convention, by suing the servants or agents of the carrier.” 1 INT’L CIV.
AVIATION ORG. [ICAO], Eighteenth Meeting, 17 September 1955, in INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW: MINUTES, 209, 216, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140
(1956) [hereinafter HAGUE MINUTES]. The Greek delegate added: “If the plaintiff
were given the possibility of obtaining higher liability in the case where he chose
to sue the servant or agent of the carrier, that would very often increase the
liability which the carrier would assume pursuant to the contract of employment
to compensate his employee.” Id. at 218. The Belgian delegate affirmed this by
stating: “In principle, it was not the servants or agents who would pay compensation, but the employers. And, without [amendment], the whole benefit of the
Convention could be put aside.” Id. The Canadian delegate remarked: “[T]he
absence of such a clause would permit a complete evasion of the provisions of the
[Warsaw] Convention in regard to the limits of liability of the carriers.” Id.
71 Article 25A of to the Warsaw Convention was added therein by Article XIV
of the Hague Protocol. Hague Protocol, supra note 14, art. XIV. This amendment
entitles agents/servants to rely on the limit of liability of the Warsaw Convention
in actions brought against them within the scope of the Warsaw Convention’s
regime, provided the action relates to damage covered by the Warsaw Convention and they can prove they acted within the scope of their employment and
without willful misconduct. Id.
72 The only provision of the Warsaw Convention extended by Article 25A to
préposés is regarding the limits of liability. See id. The words used in Article 25A(1)
are “limits of liability,” and it expressly refers to those as being contained in Article 22, which lays down the monetary limits of liability. Id. This is confirmed by
Article 25A(2), which refers to the aggregate amount recoverable from the carrier and préposés, providing that it “shall not exceed the said limits.” Id. Therefore,
there can be no doubt that the Hague Protocol only intended the monetary limit
of liability to be applied to actions against préposés and not in the other provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, such as time limitation or jurisdiction. See id.
73 Under MC99, the servant or agent may rely on the “conditions and limits of
liability.” MC99, supra note 10, art. 30(1).
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contrary, and even this was made in the context of acquiescence
to the inclusion of Article 25A, rather than in defense of the
Warsaw Convention.74 Ambrosini is reported as having said that
he always thought that “the Warsaw Convention regulated not
only the liability of the carrier, but, at the same time, that of his
servants or agents, and especially for the simple reason that, in
his opinion, the carrier and his servants or agents were, from the
legal point of view, the same person.”75
As one of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention, Ambrosini’s
comments do carry weight. However, by far the stronger position is that Article 25A was not a mere clarification but a substantive addition. So, while it cannot be stated with utter
conclusiveness, the minutes of the Hague Conference and the
adoption of Article 25A provide powerful support for the view
that the unamended Warsaw Convention does not govern the
personal liability of préposés.76 After adopting the Hague Protocol, the issue was settled for Contracting States, at least insofar as
préposés and the limit of liability was concerned. The fly in the
ointment would be that the United States refused to ratify the
Hague Protocol (it did not do so until 2003).77 Instead, the
United States opted—through its courts—for an alternative response to the unforeseen problem of préposés. This response
came in the form of a judicial decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Reed II.78

See HAGUE MINUTES, supra note 70, at 220.
Id. The minutes of the Guadalajara Conference demonstrate some continued doubt regarding the interpretation of the unamended Warsaw Convention,
with Ambrosini repeating his point from The Hague Conference. See 1 INT’L CIV.
AVIATION ORG. [ICAO], Sixteenth Meeting, 7 September 1961, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW, GUADALAJARA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1961: MINUTES
133, 134, ICAO Doc. 8301-LC/149-1 (1963) [hereinafter GUADALAJARA MINUTES].
Other delegates, namely Germany, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Japan, supported the opposite viewpoint. See id. at 134, 136–37; Twenty-Third Meeting, 11
September 1961, in GUADALAJARA MINUTES, supra, at 197.
76 See supra notes 72, 75 and accompanying text.
77 In ratifying MAP4 on July 31, 2003, the United States acceded to the Hague
Protocol. See GEORGE N. TOMPKINS, JR., LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM WARSAW 1929 TO MONTREAL 1999, at 5 (2010) (citing Avero Belg. Ins. v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005)).
78 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
74
75
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The Lamentable Authority of Reed II

On September 8, 1974, TWA Flight 841 departed from Tel
Aviv for New York.79 It made a scheduled stop in Athens and was
making its way to its next stop in Rome when a bomb in the
cargo hold exploded, causing the aircraft to crash into the Ionian Sea, close to Cephalonia, Greece.80 All seventy-nine passengers and nine crew members on board lost their lives.81 Almost
certainly seeking to avoid the limitation of liability, relatives of
some decedent passengers brought claims against members of
the senior management of the carrier for their alleged negligence in failing to prevent the planting of the bomb.82 Desiring
to rely on the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability, the
defendants argued that, for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention, the term carrier was not limited to the corporate entity but
also included employees and agents acting on its behalf (i.e.,
préposés).83
Judge Frankel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York heard the case first (Reed I).84 Although Judge
Frankel accepted that there were strong policy reasons supporting the defendant’s position, he determined for the court that
the correct interpretation of the Warsaw Convention was that it
did not apply to an action against préposés.85 Critical to the
court’s decision was its observation that the liability of a wrongdoing agent is “a separate and clear source of redress, distinct
from and logically prior to that of the principal.”86 Judge Frankel was correct. The drafting history confirms that the delegates
regarded the carrier and préposé as distinct legal entities, in line
with general principles of law.87 The court found additional supReed I, 414 F. Supp. 863, 863 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 863–64; Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1081.
81 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1081.
82 See Reed I, 414 F. Supp. at 863–64.
83 Id. at 864–65.
84 Id. at 863.
85 Id. at 865–66.
86 Id. at 866.
87 See WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH, supra note 67, at 252–53, 269, 304 (the delegates discussing the extent to which a carrier is liable for the acts of its préposés,
clearly distinguishing between the personal liability of the carrier, the personal
liability of the préposés, and the vicarious liability of the carrier for certain acts of
its préposés).
Indeed, the only indication given in the entire drafting history of the Warsaw
Convention to suggest that the drafters regarded the carrier and préposé to be one
and the same is to be found in Article 22 of the CITEJA Final Draft, the version
79
80
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port in the wording of Article 25A of the Hague Protocol and
also in the fact of U.S. non-adherence to that instrument.88
submitted by CITEJA for consideration to the Diplomatic Conference in Warsaw,
1929. The original French provided:
Le transporteur n’est pas responsable s’il prouve que lui et ses préposés ont
pris les mesures raisonnables pour éviter le dommage ou qu’il leur était impossible de les prendre, à moins que le dommage provienne d’un vice propre
de l’appareil.
Dans les transports de marchandises et de bagages, le transporteur n’est
pas responsable des fautes de pilotage, de conduite de l’aéronef ou de navigation s’il prouve qu’il a lui-même pris les mesures raisonnables pour éviter le
dommage.
[The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his servants have taken the reasonable measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for them to take them, unless the damage
arises out of an inherent defect in the aircraft.
In the carriage of goods and baggage, the carrier shall not be
liable for errors of piloting, of flying of the aircraft, or of navigation, if he proves that he himself took reasonable measures to avoid
the damage.]
DEUXIÈME CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PRIVÉ AÉRIEN (4–12 OCTOBRE
1929) VARSOVIE 172 (1930), translated in WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH, supra note
67, at 265.
In the second paragraph of Article 22 above, it refers to proof that the carrier
itself (s’il prouve qu’il a lui-même) took all reasonable measures. Whereas in a previous draft, the reference had been to the carrier and its préposés (s’il prouve que lui et
ses préposés). See COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL TECHNIQUE D’EXPERTS JURIDIQUES AÉRIENS
(C.I.T.E.J.A.), COMPTE RENDU DE LA TROISIÈME SESSION 47 (1928) (text of arts. 23
and 24 being merged to form art. 22 of the CITEJA Final Draft). The change in
terminology was the consequence of the adoption of a proposal made by the
German Delegate, but it appears to have been purely incidental and not reflective of any change in policy in respect of the liability of the carrier for the acts of
its préposés, or, more importantly, any fundamental change of mind regarding the
concept of the carrier. The proposal was made in the context of the implications
for passengers of exempting the carrier from liability for negligent pilotage, with
the resulting debate centered solely on this issue. See id. at 47–50. No apparent
significance was attached to the change in terminology (i.e., lui-même instead of
lui et ses préposés). It is submitted that himself was intended to refer to the carrier
and its préposés. This is supported by the fact that at the Warsaw Conference, the
reference to “the carrier and its préposés” was reinstated on the proposal of the
United Kingdom and appears in the text of Article 20(2) of the Warsaw Convention. See WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH, supra note 67, at 297; Warsaw Convention
supra note 9, art. 20(2).
88 Reed I, 414 F. Supp. at 867–68. Judge Frankel acknowledged that these two
points could be argued pro and con. Id. at 867. For instance, the inclusion of
wording in Article 25A that expressly extended the Warsaw Convention’s protections to servants and agents could, on the one hand, be viewed as merely affirming the existing position. Id. at 867. Alternatively, and the view that Judge
Frankel regarded as the stronger, it could be argued that it sought to provide the
wording that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention had omitted to include. Id.
at 867–68.
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Judge Frankel also cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Robert C. Herd & Co., v. Krawill Machinery Corp. as support.89 In
that case, the Supreme Court had refused to extend the Carriage of Goods by Seas Act (COGSA) limitations to defendant
stevedores, holding that COGSA applied to the carrier but not
to its stevedores or agents.90
However, it was an entirely different story on appeal in Reed II.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had no doubt
as to the adverse effects of not permitting préposés to rely on the
protections of the Warsaw Convention:
Should employees not be covered by the provisions of the Convention, the entire character of international air disaster litigation involving planes owned and operated by American airlines,
would be radically changed. The liability limitations of the Convention could then be circumvented by the simple device of a
suit against the pilot and/or other employees, which would force
the American employer, if it had not already done so, to provide
indemnity for higher recoveries as the price for service by employees who are essential to the continued operation of its airline. The increased cost would, of course, be passed on to
passengers.91

One should not be in the least bit perturbed if, on reading this
excerpt, one’s impression is of a court preparing the way for a
purely policy-driven conclusion because that is precisely what
transpired. What reference there was to legal principle in the
court’s holding served only to lend the thinnest doctrinal gloss
to a blatant example of judicial legislating.
The context to the litigation provides some guidance as to
why the court was willing to bend over backward to reach a conclusion in support of the defendants. The Second Circuit referred to the quantum involved in the case, noting that the
plaintiffs were demanding U.S. $8.6 million and that the nine
plaintiffs involved were only a fraction of the total possible plaintiffs—indeed, the court noted that “the case on appeal is the test
case for the remainder of the suits consolidated with it below.”92
The court even referred to the then-recent Tenerife disaster (involving the U.S. airline Pan American Airways) and the ensuing
litigation in which one plaintiff had taken inspiration from the
89 Id. at 866 (citing Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297
(1959)).
90 Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. at 302–03.
91 Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977).
92 Id. at 1090 n.15.
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district court’s judgment in Reed I and added the pilot as a defendant in an action for U.S. $4.5 million.93 Bearing in mind
that there were 583 fatalities in the Tenerife disaster,94 the court
was clearly cognizant of the potentially crushing liability that
might befall airlines if the Warsaw Convention could be circumvented by simply suing préposés. It must be noted that the airline
industry was in dire straits at that time,95 so significant political
pressure must surely have been felt to safeguard the financially
crippled airlines. Non-adherence to the Hague Protocol must
also have played a role because, had the district court’s judgment stood, the U.S. government would have been under far
greater pressure to secure U.S. adherence to the Hague Protocol, something it was opposed to as a matter of principle.96
93 Id. at 1092 (“Indeed, in one lawsuit just commenced in New York seeking
$4.5 million for the death of a passenger killed in the recent collision of two
Boeing 747 planes in the Canary Islands, the plaintiffs have taken the cue from
the district court’s decision here and joined one of the pilots as a co-defendant. If
this method of circumventing the Convention’s liability limitation is accepted,
not only will the purpose of defining the limits of the carrier’s obligations be
circumvented, but in the process the Convention’s most fundamental objective of
providing a uniform system of liability and litigation rules for international air
disasters will be abandoned as well.”).
94 Tenerife: Remembering the World’s Deadliest Aviation Disaster, CBS NEWS, https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/tenerife-remembering-the-worlds-deadliest-aviation-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/74JN-ZNUL] (Mar. 27, 2017, 9:32 AM).
95 One commentator summed up the global state of affairs of the air transport
industry in the 1970s as follows:
As we all know now, the world economy did not develop according
to the optimistic extrapolations of the 1960s. And the airlines were
hard hit by the economic recession, inflation, currency fluctuations, and energy crises of the 1970s. . . .
The inevitable result was unprecedented overcapacity on key
routes, especially the critical North Atlantic routes. In 1975 unused
capacity on the North Atlantic alone was equivalent to 15,000
empty Boeing 747 round trips. The overcapacity problem was aggravated by rapidly accelerating cost pressures. The impact of the
energy crisis on airlines was particularly great. In just a few years the
fuel share of total operating costs rocketed from 10 to 25 percent.
Christer Jönsson, Sphere of Flying: The Politics of International Aviation, 35 INT’L
ORG. 273, 286 (1981) (footnote omitted); see also Werner Guldimann, Bilateral
Agreements as Regulatory Instruments in International Commercial Aviation, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: LAW, ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 25TH ANNIVERSARY
CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 17–19, 1976, at 113, 115–16 (Nicolas Mateesco Matte
ed., 1976) (giving a contemporary account of the situation of the airline industry
in the mid-1970s).
96 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 532–33 (1967).
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Evidence that the true motivation for the decision was purely
political is further evidenced by the fact that the court never
clearly established a clear ratio decidendi. Instead, it hedged its
bets by providing two half-baked efforts at a ratio, neither of
which did it follow through on to completion.
In its first effort, the court asked itself if the term carrier was
intended to cover just the corporate entity or whether it “was
intended to embrace the group or community of persons actually performing the corporate entity’s function.”97 While the answer under the common law would be in the negative, the U.S.
court was—some might say—surprisingly open to considering
what the views of other jurisdictions might be.98 Without any
firm authoritative basis,99 the court determined that in some
civil law systems, the employer and employee are treated as one
and that this could have been the intention of the drafters of the
Warsaw Convention.100 This is not the case.101 Rather than follow through on this line of argument, the court just left the matter hanging, declaring that it could not deem a common law
reading as controlling.102
For its second effort at a ratio, the court looked to Article 24,
indulging itself in an expansive reading of that article based on
a dubious premise. The court read Article 24, specifically the
part, “any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention,”103 as meaning that any action for damages arising out
of the events anticipated by Articles 17, 18, and 19 is governed
Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1083.
See GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE
WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 281 (1977) (“The [Reed II] court . . . displayed a remarkable willingness to consider what was the position of the civil
law.”).
99 See Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1083–84 (referring to the comments of Ambrosini
raised during the Hague Conference in 1955 and repeated at the Guadalajara
Conference in 1961); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
100 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1088 (stating that the interpretation “reflect[s] the legal
principles of many civil law states, which treat the corporation and its employees
as one.”).
101 See MILLER, supra note 98, at 281 (“[T]he court fell victim of two of the
dangers inherent in any enquiry into foreign law, i.e., an incomplete access to
proper sources of information and a misunderstanding of foreign law material
taken out of context.”).
102 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1084.
103 In full, Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention.
97
98

28

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.104 On application
to the facts of the case, the court explained that since the action
was one for damages, and because it arose out of the death of a
passenger during international carriage by air, it was covered by
the Warsaw Convention and subject to its monetary limitation.105 The implicit reasoning of the Second Circuit was that
the scope application of the Warsaw Convention is effectively
determined by Article 24, i.e., that the plaintiff’s action is one
for damages arising out of an event covered by the Warsaw
Convention.106
This second ratio rested on a highly questionable point of interpretation concerning the translation of the French word cas
in Articles 17 and 24 of the Warsaw Convention (translated as
event and case, respectively). The court thought the plural of cas
had been inaccurately translated as cases in Article 24, because it
thought the word cas did not, in French, ordinarily refer to a
lawsuit, i.e., a case in the juridical sense.107 The court thought
the word event was the more accurate translation for the purposes of Article 24 and, crucially, that the word event was more
expansive in meaning than case.108 However, there is nothing to
suggest that the translation of cas in Article 24 as cases was intended to be understood as case in the juridical sense; it is more
likely that the two words, i.e., case and event, were regarded as
synonymous.109 One can strongly suspect that the court solely
(2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to
who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are
their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 24.
104 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1084–85.
105 Id. Based on its belief that “a construction of the language of Article 22(1)
and 24 which extends the Convention’s liability limitation to passenger claims
against employees not only reflects the plain meaning and purpose of the French
text of these articles but accomplishes all of the Convention’s objectives,” the
court held, “plaintiffs may not recover from an air carrier’s employees or from
the carrier and its employees together a sum greater than that recoverable in a
suit against the carrier itself as limited by the Warsaw Convention with its applicable agreements and protocols.” Id. at 1092–93.
106 Id. at 1084.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 The word cas in the authentic French text of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was translated into the word event in the English version. See, e.g., Warsaw
Convention, supra note 9, art. 17 (“Le transporteur est responsable du dommage
survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lésion corporelle subie par un voyageur
lorsque l’accident qui a causé le dommage s’est produit à bord de l’aéronef ou au cours de
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seized on the word cas to inject ambiguity into the text and
thereby justify a purposive interpretation.
The court failed to follow through on its reasoning and
elected—yet again—to leave the ratio half-baked. What is missing from the equation are the identities of the parties to the
litigation. If one follows through on the court’s logic, the Warsaw Convention would apply to all actions for damages arising
during international carriage from an event described in Articles 17, 18, or 19, regardless of the identity of the defendant or
plaintiff.110 An action by a passenger against a manufacturer
would be covered, as would the third-party action by that manufacturer against the carrier. Of course, not even the Second Circuit thought an action against a manufacturer was covered.111 It
took for granted that the defendant must be a carrier, but this
would not explain why the préposé should be covered. Why
should one third party (i.e., the manufacturer) be outside the
Convention, but another (i.e., the préposé) be within it? Ultimately, this line of argument simply reverts to the original question of whether the definition of the carrier was intended to
include its préposés; the second ratio reverts to the first. Thus, on
closer inspection, the court’s second attempt at a ratio also fails
to pass muster.
The doctrinal basis for the court’s ultimate decision was decidedly patchy and left deliberately vague. On the one hand, its
interpretation of carrier was dubious given the court’s assessment
of civilian law. On the other hand, its unjustly expansive interpretation of Article 24 and the purported scope of the Warsaw
Convention was misleading. In the Author’s view, it was not the
intention of the court to resolve the matter through doctrinal
reasoning. Instead, the court was satisfied with fumbling around
in the text of the Warsaw Convention until it could rustle up
some ambiguity to act as the shakiest of pegs upon which to
hang its purely policy-driven decision. One wonders if by flingtoutes opérations d’embarquement et de débarquement. . . . The carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.”) (emphasis added).
110 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1084–85.
111 See id. at 1091 (“A good example of the ‘judicial nightmare,’ . . . that could
result is In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975),
involving 203 suits by 337 decedents primarily against the aircraft manufacturer
for defective design, arising out of the crash of an American-built plane owned by
Turkish Air Lines shortly after takeoff in France.”) (citation omitted).
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ing these two rationes together, the court had its fingers crossed
that it might magically result in a sufficiently convincing ratio
decidendi; no such luck!
While the doctrinal basis was feeble, the court could, in contrast, rely on several powerful policy considerations that justified
extending the protections of the Warsaw Convention to préposés.
Foremost, it would ensure that the protection provided by the
Warsaw Convention to the carrier could not be circumvented by
plaintiffs bringing actions against the carrier’s préposés, thus safeguarding the objects of the Warsaw Convention.112 The court
explained that “To permit a suit for an unlimited amount of
damages against a carrier’s employees for personal injuries to a
passenger would unquestionably undermine this purpose behind Article 22, since it would permit plaintiffs to recover from
the carrier through its employees damages in excess of the Convention’s limits.”113
The Second Circuit’s holding in Reed II, though well-intentioned, was nonetheless a thinly veiled example of judicial
amendment of an international treaty. Simply put, the United
States did not wish to adhere to the Hague Protocol, so instead,
through its courts, it attempted to cherry-pick what it liked
about the Hague Protocol, i.e., the extension of the limits of
liability to préposés. At its base, Reed II is just a judicial ratification
of part of the Hague Protocol. For that reason and its lack of
doctrinal cogency, it is an awful decision that should be
expunged.
Fortunately, the baleful influence of Reed II has now been curtailed by U.S. adherence to the Hague Protocol (via Montreal
Additional Protocol No. 4) in 2003 and then to MC99. However,
Reed II committed two major errors that have been hugely troublesome for the question of third-party actions under both WCS
and MC99. For this reason, we ought not to allow Reed II to fade
away into obscurity; it must be recognized as bad law and expressly overruled.
The first error committed by the court was that, although it
had limited its decision to the specific issue before it, i.e., the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention’s monetary limitation,
once the court did this, it was inevitable that subsequent decisions114 would extend the coverage to the remainder of the War112
113
114

Id. at 1089.
Id.
See cases discussed infra Section II.B.
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saw Convention (e.g., time limits and jurisdiction) to actions
against préposés. Not even the Hague Protocol had done that.
The second error was that the court fostered the notion that
the identity of the plaintiff is not of critical importance to determine the application of the Warsaw Convention.115 This was not
particularly mischievous on the facts of Reed v. Wiser because the
plaintiffs were the representatives of the decedent passengers.116
However, subsequent cases117 would take Reed II to mean that
the identity of the plaintiff is irrelevant so long as the action is
against a carrier for loss covered by the Warsaw Convention.
This meant the Warsaw Convention might apply to a third-party
action taken against a carrier, which is the question that directly
concerns this Article.
3.

MC99 and Préposés

It would be remiss at this point not to briefly mention the
state of play under MC99 with respect to préposés. Thankfully, the
provisions introduced by the Hague Protocol of 1955 and the
Guadalajara Convention of 1961 are replicated almost verbatim
in MC99.118 For instance, Article 30 of MC99 provides:
See Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1079–80.
The plaintiffs were referred to as “[p]ersonal representatives, heirs and
next of kin of nine airline passengers killed” and as “administrators and executors.” Id. Although it is not expressly stated in the opinion, the plaintiffs were
most likely exercising the decedent passengers’ cause of action against the defendant; they were not suing in their own personal right (e.g., as occurs with a
wrongful death action).
117 See cases discussed infra Section II.B.
118 See generally Guadalajara Convention, supra note 46. The Guadalajara Convention was introduced to deal with a specific type of préposé, i.e., the actual carrier. Id. at 34. Normally, the party assuming the obligation toward the passenger
(or shipper) to provide international carriage by air is also the party performing
the carriage. See id. at 32, 34. However, there are situations in which these two
parties are different persons. In such circumstances, who is the carrier for the
Warsaw Convention? Is the carrier the party who contracts with the passenger?
Or is it the carrier party who provides the actual carriage? The possibility that the
contracting carrier might not be the same party actually performing the carriage
in question created a potential loophole in the Warsaw Convention. If one believes that the Warsaw Convention applies only to the contracting carrier, then it
will be inapplicable to any action brought against another party who is performing the carriage. As such, not only will the de facto carrier be unable to rely upon
the conditions and limits of liability provided by the Warsaw Convention, the
passenger will not benefit from the provisions of the Warsaw Convention either,
e.g., the presumption of fault. The Guadalajara Convention’s solution was to
adopt a distinction between the contractual carrier and the actual carrier and to
make the actual carrier subject to the rules of Warsaw/Hague. Id. at 34. The
Guadalajara Convention is a supplementary convention to the Warsaw Conven115
116
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1. If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier arising out of damage to which the Convention relates,
such servant or agent, if they prove that they acted within the
scope of their employment, shall be entitled to avail themselves of the conditions and limits of liability which the carrier itself is entitled to invoke under this Convention.
2. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier,
its servants and agents, in that case, shall not exceed the said
limits.
3. Save in respect of the carriage of cargo, the provisions of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply if it is
proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of
the servant or agent done with intent to cause damage or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result.119

Articles 30 and 43120 of MC99 were modeled on Article 25A of
the Warsaw Convention (as amended by the Hague Protocol)
and Article V of the Guadalajara Convention, respectively.121
Thus, under MC99, a Reed v. Wiser-type scenario involving an action against a préposé will be covered. However, in the context of
MC99, the reality, insofar as the limits of liability are concerned,
is that there is almost no incentive for a plaintiff to pursue a
préposé because unlimited recovery against an insured carrier
without the need to prove fault is guaranteed in most cases.122
tion (as amended by the Hague Protocol) and is reasonably well ratified (86 State
Parties at present). See Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Current Lists of Parties to
Multilateral Air Law Treaties, https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/lists/current
lists of parties/allitems.aspx [https://perma.cc/JP4L-P55Q] (search “8181” in
the “Find an item” field; then select “English” under “Status (EN)”). However,
the United States never acceded to it. See id.
119 MC99, supra note 10, art. 30.
120 Id. art. 43 (“In relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, any
servant or agent of that carrier or of the contracting carrier shall, if they prove
that they acted within the scope of their employment, be entitled to avail themselves of the conditions and limits of liability which are applicable under this
Convention to the carrier whose servant or agent they are, unless it is proved that
they acted in a manner that prevents the limits of liability from being invoked in
accordance with this Convention.”).
121 Article 25A had also been incorporated into the Warsaw Convention System
by Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4. MAP4, supra note 46, art. X.
122 Regarding the liability regime for passenger death and bodily injury, MC99
consists of a two-tier system. Tier one provides for strict liability of the carrier up
to the defined limit. MC99, supra note 10, art. 21(1). The limit was originally SDR
100,000, but this figure was raised in 2009 to SDR 113,100 and then again in 2019
to SDR 128,821, pursuant to Article 24 of MC99. See id. art. 24; Int’l Civ. Aviation
Org. [ICAO], 2019 Revised Limits of Liability Under the Montreal Convention of 1999,
https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/2019_Re-
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THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS

AND

WCS

One of the peculiarities of Reed v. Wiser is that there was no
third-party action directly involved. The action was one taken by
the relatives of the passengers against the carrier’s préposés, and
these préposés had not in fact taken a third-party action against
the carrier. Nevertheless, it was always understood by the court
and all concerned that indemnification of the préposé by the carrier was inevitable. Indeed, it was the abstract potential for,
rather than the actual existence of, third-party actions that
drove, more than anything, the court’s decision. Even so, it is
ironic that Reed II never had to deal directly with the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions. What Reed II
certainly did do was leave the door open for courts to conclude
that the Warsaw Convention applied to third-party actions taken
against carriers. Unsurprisingly, some courts would take this opportunity, whereas others would not. This Section examines
these two positions and attempts to divine which is correct. For
convenience, they shall be referred to as the orthodox approach
and the alternative approach.
1.

The Orthodox Approach

The Warsaw Convention does not mention recourse actions
or third-party actions for contribution or indemnification.123
This is not the glaring omission that it might seem. At the time
of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting, the availability of a right to
noncontractual contribution indemnification was not yet a feature of the common law, and its availability within the civilian
legal systems was mostly theoretical.124 As such, the drafters were
vised_Limits_of_Liability_Under_the_Montreal_Convention_1999.aspx [https://
perma.cc/UQ5W-WTDH]. For liability beyond that limit, tier two provides for
unlimited recovery from the carrier based on the presumption of fault. MC99,
supra note 10, art. 20. Regarding both tiers, the carrier can invoke the defense of
contributory negligence. Id. For tier-two liability only, the carrier can exonerate
itself on proof of the absence of fault of the carrier or its préposés, or that the
damage was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a third
party. Id. art. 21(2).
123 Even the minutes of the Warsaw Conference reveal little. See generally WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH, supra note 67. The delegates were aware of the possibility
of the carrier possibly seeking recourse against the aircraft manufacturer but regarded them as unlikely to arise in practice given the tendency of manufacturers
to agree to express warranties against defects and other far-reaching provisions
aimed at insulating them from any liability. See id. at 48. In any case, such recourse actions were predicated on the contract of sale, not common law.
124 See generally Cluxton, supra note 24.
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vindicated in adopting a two-party paradigm of plaintiff-passenger/shipper versus defendant carrier. However, developments
in the law, e.g., the general doctrine of negligence and strict
products liability, created the real possibility of noncontractual
recourse actions.125
The topic of recourse actions emerged during the Diplomatic
Conference of 1961 in Guadalajara, Mexico, at which the Guadalajara Convention was adopted.126 The Guadalajara Convention sought to ensure that the Warsaw Convention would apply
to qualifying carriage performed by a carrier other than the contracting carrier, i.e., the actual carrier.127 In relation to carriage
performed by the actual carrier, the Guadalajara Convention
makes the contracting carrier and actual carrier jointly and severally liable;128 thus, permitting the plaintiff to choose whether
to sue one or the other, or both.129 Joint and several liability
means, for example, that the contracting carrier might be held
liable for the entire damage arising during the carriage performed by the actual carrier. Therefore, the delegates regarded
it essential that recourse between the carriers be supported.130
Even so, the extent to which the drafters intended the Guadalajara Convention to regulate the right of recourse was minimal; it
only applied to the case of actual and contracting carriers, and
the full extent of its application was only to ensure that a prima
facie right of joinder existed.131 The minutes of the Conference
See id. at 32–34 (Section II.C.4).
Guadalajara Convention, supra note 46.
127 The actual carrier is defined as “a person, other than the contracting carrier, who, by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier, performs the whole
or part of the carriage contemplated in paragraph b) but who is not with respect
to such part a successive carrier within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention.”
Id. art. I. For a summary of the main aims of the Guadalajara Convention, see
supra note 118.
128 See Guadalajara Convention, supra note 46, art. III.
129 See id. art. VII.
130 See Twelfth Meeting, 5 September 1961, in GUADALAJARA MINUTES, supra note
75, at 109 (comments of the Delegate from Spain); see also Fourteenth Meeting, 6
September 1961, in GUADALAJARA MINUTES, supra note 75, at 120–21 (comments of
the Delegate of Japan).
131 This was clear from the draft version of the Guadalajara Convention, where
the commentary on the draft convention explained: “The second sentence of
Article VII permits the carrier against whom an action is brought to have the
other carrier joined in the proceedings as a party.” 2 INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG.
[ICAO], Secretariat Commentary on the Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other Than the
Contracting Carrier, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW: GUADALAJARA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1961: DOCUMENTS 23, 32, ICAO Doc. 8301-LC/149-2
125
126
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show a remarkable amount of debate on the issue and it is undoubtedly the case that the delegates intended the reach of the
Warsaw Convention to stretch no further.132 In fact, they were
pedantic in ensuring that the procedure and effects of such joinder should be left to the applicable national law.133 The Guadalajara Convention neither creates nor presumes the existence of
a right of recourse between actual carriers and contracting carriers; it limits itself to merely facilitating recourse actions where
they exist under le droit commun by ensuring a right of joinder for
each carrier against the other.134
The first explicit reference within WCS to a right of recourse
came in 1971 with the Guatemala City Protocol (GCP).135 However, this reference was only made “in order to remove any
doubts.”136 Such rights were already enforced in the context of
(1963) [hereinafter GUADALAJARA DOCUMENTS]. The explanation continued: “In
such case the national law would determine the consequences of the joinder and
these consequences may vary in different States.”Id.
132 See, e.g., Twenty-Fourth Meeting, 12 September 1961, in GUADALAJARA MINUTES,
supra note 75, at 204–11 (delegates debating Article VII of the Guadalajara
Convention).
133 See, for example, the German Delegate’s concerns regarding the English
term party and the ensuing debate. Eighteenth Meeting, 8 September 1961, in GuADALAJARA MINUTES, supra note 75, at 153. As a result of these concerns, Article VII of
the Guadalajara Convention provides: “If the action is brought against only one
of those carriers, that carrier shall have the right to require the other carrier to
be joined in the proceedings, the procedure and effects being governed by the
law of the court seised of the case.” Guadalajara Convention, supra note 46, art.
VII. Compare this with the draft proposal for the second sentence of Article VII
submitted to the Conference, which stated: “If the action is brought against only
one of those carriers, that carrier shall have the right to have the other made a
party to the proceedings.” Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other Than the Contracting
Carrier, in GUADALAJARA DOCUMENTS, supra note 131, at 20.
134 The purpose of Article VII was to facilitate two things: first, it ensured that
the carrier who was sued could rely on the participation of the other carrier (in
whose possession the majority of evidence might be); second, it facilitated the
distribution of liability between the carriers. See Nineteenth Meeting, 8 September
1961, in GUADALAJARA MINUTES, supra note 75, at 157 (comments of the Delegate
of Spain). Depending on national law, the latter purpose could be served by joinder of the carrier, by either making the other carrier a co-defendant, or by allowing the carrier being sued by the plaintiff to seek a recourse action against the
other carrier in the same proceedings. See id.
135 Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 46, art. XIII. Article XIII would have
inserted a new Article 30A to the Warsaw Convention.
136 1 INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. [ICAO], Nineteenth Meeting of the Commission of
the Whole, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW: GUATEMALA CITY, FEBRUARY–MARCH 1971: MINUTES 191, 197, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) (per the
reported comments of the Dutch Delegate).
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WCS, not in the sense that it was recognized that a right of recourse existed under the Warsaw Convention, but that such
rights, however founded, were not incompatible with the Warsaw Convention. GCP never entered into force, but the right of
recourse provision contained therein was included in the 1975
Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 (MAP4),137 which entered
into force in 1998.138 All this shows is that it was understood that
WCS (with the exception of the right of joinder under the Guadalajara Convention) does not regulate recourse actions.
This is reflected in the orthodox approach adopted by some
courts. For example, in the 1978 Canadian case of Connaught
Laboratories Ltd. v. Air Canada,139 Connaught Laboratories contracted, through Air Canada, for the carriage of a cargo of polio
vaccines from Ontario, Canada, to Quito, Ecuador.140 Under the
air waybill, the cargo was to be carried by Air Canada to Miami,
Florida, and then by Andes Airlines onward to Quito;141 it was
thus a case of successive carriage. Due to Andes Airlines’ failure
to take the necessary precautions to ensure that the vaccines remained frozen, the vaccines had thawed by the time they were
delivered to the consignee, thus rendering them worthless.142
Connaught sued Air Canada, which in turn brought a thirdparty action for indemnification or contribution against Andes
Airlines.143 As it happened, the main action against Air Canada
had been commenced within the two-year window provided by
the Warsaw Convention, but the third-party action by Air Canada against Andes Airlines had commenced after the two-year
window expired.144 Andes Airlines sought to rely on the time
limitation contained in the Warsaw Convention (i.e., Article 29)
to defeat the third-party action.145 The Supreme Court of Ontario addressed the issue by asking itself whether the Warsaw ConSee MAP4, supra note 46, art. XI.
Id. at 31.
139 (1978) 94 D.L.R. 3d 586 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
140 Id. at 587. For the court’s summary of the facts of the case, see id. at 587–88.
141 Id. at 588.
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 593.
145 Id. Although Judge Robins found that Air Canada was liable to the plaintiff
in the main action, he was in no doubt that Andes Airlines was truly to blame. Id.
at 593 (“In effect, Andes Airlines’ position is that Air Canada must be denied its
remedy because of art. 29 even though it is conceded that it is entitled on the
merits of the matter to be indemnified.”).
137
138
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vention applied to claims between carriers, reaching the view
that it does not:
In short, while the Convention deals with the claims of passengers, consignors and consignees, and the liability of carriers
therefor, it does not deal with the claim of carriers inter se. Consequently, it is my view that art. 29 does not apply to the action of
Air Canada against Andes Airlines and does not constitute the
statutory bar it is said to represent.146

The manifest common sense of the ruling in Connaught seems
indisputable. Indeed, if Article 29 were to apply in such cases,
then, where the plaintiff commenced the main action against
the carrier at the eleventh hour, the carrier would, in practical
terms, be deprived of the opportunity to seek recourse from
other carriers since the two-year limitation would expire before
it had the chance. This is something that third-party defendants
in other cases have exploited.147
Connaught stands for the position that the Warsaw Convention
only governs the action between the passenger (or shipper)
against the carrier (although we shall have cause to question this
view in Part IV of this Article).148 The plaintiff’s cause of action
is founded upon the relationship of carriage established between the parties, so if the action is not one between the proper
parties, then it is, by definition, not covered by the Warsaw Convention.149 The identity of the parties to the cause of action is
thus crucial to determining the question of its applicability.
Therefore, actions taken by one carrier against another, or by a
carrier’s préposé against a carrier, or by a passenger against a
manufacturer, and so on, are not governed by the Warsaw
Convention.

Id. at 593–94.
See, e.g., Allianz Glob. Corp. & Specialty v. EMO Trans Cal., Inc., No. C 094893, 2010 WL 2594360, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010). In this case, the plaintiff
in the main action had brought the action against the defendant just before the
expiration of the Warsaw Convention’s two-year limitation period. Id. at *1. This
meant that when the defendant subsequently brought a third-party action for
contribution, the third-party defendant was able to argue that the Warsaw Convention’s time limit had expired. Id. at *2. The court held the defendant to the
time limit, even though it recognized the inequity involved in depriving the defendant of a remedy “due to no fault of its own.” Id. at *5.
148 See Connaught, 94 D.L.R. 3d at 593–94.
149 For more on the cause of action in the Warsaw Convention and MC99, see
generally CLUXTON, supra note 47.
146
147
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The Alternative Approach

The alternative approach is grounded in the same reasoning
as that applied by the Second Circuit in Reed II; that is, that the
meaning of the term carrier includes préposés and that any action
against a carrier, coming within a broad interpretation of Article
24, is governed by the Warsaw Convention, regardless of who
the plaintiff is.150
In the 1985 case of L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp.,151
the Supreme Court of Onondaga County, New York, applied the
Warsaw Convention’s two-year limitation to a third-party action
brought by the contracting carrier against the actual carrier.152
In the court’s view, this was supported by the wording of Article
24(1), which it construed liberally to mean that “an action ‘however founded’ would include an action for contribution.”153
While Reed II was not cited as authority for this point, the reasoning is based on the same reading of Article 24 as that of the
Second Circuit.154 The court’s understanding was that the contribution claim arose out of a factual scenario of damage to
cargo during qualifying carriage, and as such, that it was an ac-

150 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977); see also, e.g., DRION, supra note 61, at 104
(“It is submitted that nothing prevents the carrier from invoking the limits of
Article 22 in case of recourse actions arising from the death or injuries of passengers, or loss or damage of baggage or goods, or in case of delay, provided these
occurrences fall within the scope of Articles 17, 18 or 19.”). Drion took the view
that the phrase “however founded” in Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention,
“clearly brings delictual recourse actions under the limits and conditions of the
Convention.” Id.
151 488 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). Unfortunately, the facts of the dispute were not presented in the report, but what is clear is that the plaintiff had
brought an action against Circle Air Freight (the contracting carrier), who had
brought third-party actions against Banco de Santander and Iberia (the actual
carrier). See id. at 548. Iberia claimed the third-party action was time-barred,
whereas Circle Air Freight maintained that WCS did not apply to its claim for
contribution. Id.
152 Id. at 550 (“[T]he two-year period of limitation set forth in Article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention is applicable to actions for contribution.”).
153 Id. at 549. Article 24(1) provides: “In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19
any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.” Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art.
24(1) (emphasis added). Article 24(2) applies 24(1) to Article 17. See id. art.
24(2) (“In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons
who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.”).
154 See L.B. Smith, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 549; Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1092.
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tion for damages covered by Article 18; therefore, the Warsaw
Convention applied.155
A key distinguishing feature between this alternative approach, as presented in L.B. Smith, and the orthodox approach
of Connaught is that the alternative approach does not attend to
the question of the identity of the plaintiff. The orthodox view
would read Articles 17, 18, and 19 as envisaging a claim by a
passenger or shipper against a carrier.156 Indeed, the very premise of the Warsaw Convention is to regulate the relationship
between the passenger or shipper and the carrier with regard to
the latter’s liability toward the former, certainly not the liability
between carriers.157 The terms and conditions of the Warsaw
Convention referred to in Article 24 apply to the liability of the
carrier toward the passenger or shipper, not to another carrier.158 While the contribution action in L.B. Smith was an action
against a carrier relating to damage to cargo, it was not taken by
a shipper.159
In a series of cases decided in the late 1980s, i.e., Split End Ltd.
v. Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc.,160 Data General Corp. v. Air Express
International Co.,161 and Mitchell, Shackleton & Co., Ltd. v. Air ExWarsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 24(2).
See Connaught Labs. Ltd. v. Air Can. (1978), 94 D.L.R. 3d 586, 593–94
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
157 Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, arts. 17–30.
158 Id. at 3020.
159 L.B. Smith, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
160 No. 85 Civ. 1506, 1986 WL 2199 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1986). The plaintiff,
Split End Ltd. (Split End), purchased women’s clothing from a company in the
Philippines, Sampaguita Garment Corp. (SGC), who contracted with Dimerco
Express (Phils) Inc. (Dimerco), to ship them from Manila to New York for delivery to plaintiff consignee, Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Co., who would then
notify Split End. Id. at *1. Dimerco issued an air waybill to SGC, naming SGC as
shipper. Id. Therefore, it is assumed that Dimerco did this as principal and thus
assumed the obligation of carriage. See Lawrence Goldhirsch, Note, Prescription
Period for Third-Party Actions Under the Warsaw Convention, 12 AIR L. 94, 96 (1987)
(the author taking the view that Dimerco was the carrier and that the main action
against Dimerco was subject to the Warsaw Convention). Dimerco contracted
under a separate air waybill with Kuwait Airways Corp. to transport the goods by
air and to deliver them to Dimerco’s U.S. affiliate. See Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at
*1. The goods were stored in New York by Kuwait Airways’ ground handling
agent, Aer Lingus Airlines (Aer Lingus). Id. The goods were damaged, and Split
End sued Dimerco, who in turn brought third-party actions against Kuwait Airways Corp. and Aer Lingus. Id. The third-party defendants argued that the action
had been brought against them outside the two-year time limit. Id. at *4.
161 676 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The plaintiff, Data General Corp. (Data
General), contracted with Air Express International Co. (Air Express) to transport computer components from New York to Madrid, and the plaintiff alleged
155
156
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press International, Inc.,162 the District Court for the Southern District of New York approved the proposition of L.B. Smith that the
Warsaw Convention applies to third-party actions taken against
carriers (as defined in Reed II to include préposés).163 In all
three cases, the shippers had contracted with the defendant air
freight companies for the carriage of goods by air and then sued
the defendants for damages.164 In turn, the carriers brought
third-party actions for contribution or indemnification against
sub-contracted carriers or ground handling agents (GHAs), or
both.165 In each case, the third-party action commenced after
the two-year limitation provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention, upon which the third-party defendants sought to
rely as grounds for dismissal.166 In all of these cases, there was no
dispute about the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to the
main action, i.e., the action taken by the shipper against the
contracting carrier.167 The question of the Warsaw Convention’s
applicability only emerged in relation to the third-party actions.
that they were in damaged condition on delivery in Madrid. See id. at 538–39 (“Air
Express had agreed to transport the computer parts from New York to Madrid,
Spain.” (emphasis added)); see also Motorola, Inc. v. MSAS Cargo Int’l, Inc., 42 F.
Supp. 2d 952, 956 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (wherein the Data General case is referred to
as a case between carriers). Air Express had subcontracted Iberia, Lineas Aereas
de España (Iberia), to perform the carriage aboard one of its flights and placed
the blame solely on its shoulders. Data Gen., 676 F. Supp. at 539. Air Express
brought a third-party action against Iberia for indemnification. Id. Iberia sought
dismissal on the grounds that it was time-barred by the Warsaw Convention. Id.
Air Express complained that the plaintiff had only served it less than three weeks
before the expiration of the two-year time limitation and therefore was unable to
bring its suit against Iberia on time. Id. at 540 n.1.
162 704 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Plaintiff shipper contracted Air Express
Int’l, Inc. (Air Express) to transport a crankshaft from London to New York. Id.
at 525. In New York, the carrier’s ground handler, Triangle Aviation Services,
Inc. (Triangle), damaged the crankshaft in the process of off-loading it. Id. The
plaintiff sued Air Express one day shy of the two-year limitation period. Id. The
defendant then promptly filed a third-party action against Triangle, albeit
outside the two-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention. Id. Triangle sought
dismissal on the grounds that the time limitation of the Warsaw Convention applied to the third-party action. Id. at 525–26.
163 Id. at 527; Data Gen., 676 F. Supp. at 540; Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *4.
164 Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *1; Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525; Data Gen., 676
F. Supp. at 538.
165 Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *1; Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525; Data Gen., 676
F. Supp. at 538.
166 Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *1, 4; Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525; Data Gen.,
676 F. Supp. at 538.
167 See, e.g., Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *1 n.2 (“No party argues that this case
involves an area to which the convention does not apply.”).
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In Split End and Data General, the court decided that the Warsaw Convention did apply to the third-party action in question,
but, disappointingly, the opinions do not reveal any doctrinal
basis for the holdings; instead, the court just followed precedent.168 The most probable—if not only—explanation is that
the court in Split End and Data General applied the Warsaw Convention because it understood Reed II as holding that the Warsaw Convention governs any action for damages against a carrier
(as including its préposés) arising out of an event covered by the
Warsaw Convention irrespective of who the plaintiff is. In addition, the court also reached the inevitable construction—implicit in Reed II—that the Warsaw Convention’s provisions
(specifically the time limitation) generally applied to third-party
actions, not just its monetary limitations.169 Similar decisions
were reached in subsequent cases.170 But what of the Mitchell
case?
168 See id. at *4 (citing L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp., 488 N.Y.S.2d
547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)); Data Gen., 676 F. Supp. at 540.
169 In most cases, the provision at issue was the time limitation for commencing suit. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. MSAS Cargo Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 952, 954
(N.D. Cal. 1998); Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525–26; Data Gen., 676 F. Supp. at
540–41; Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *6; L.B. Smith, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 549. Article
29(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides: “The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within two years, reckoned from the date of
arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have
arrived, or from the date on which the carriage stopped.” Warsaw Convention,
supra note 9, art. 29(1).
170 See Royal Ins. Co. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 834 F. Supp. 633, 636
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Motorola, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 956. In Royal Insurance, the plaintiff
(as subrogee of Corning, Inc.’s cause of action) sued the defendant for damaging
a shipment sent by Corning from the United States to South Korea. 834 F. Supp.
at 633. In turn, Emery brought a third-party action against Singapore Airlines
that it claimed, relying on Connaught, was not governed by WCS. Id. at 634. The
court, relying on precedent and noting that no language in the treaty supported
Emery’s position, held that the time limits of WCS applied. Id. at 635 (citing Data
Gen., 676 F. Supp. at 539; L.B. Smith, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 547). In Motorola, the plaintiff (Motorola, Inc.) had contracted MSAS Cargo to transport computer equipment from San Francisco to Tokyo; in turn, MSAS arranged for the airline
(Asiana) to transport the cargo. 42 F. Supp. 2d at 953. When the cargo was collected by the consignee (Nippon Motorola), damage was noted on the air waybill,
for which Motorola sued MSAS. Id. MSAS then brought a third-party action for
contribution or indemnification against Asiana. Id. Motorola later amended its
complaint to list Asiana as a defendant. Id. Asiana sought summary judgment
against all claims, arguing that notice and filing of claim were not brought in
accordance with the provisions of WCS. Id. at 954. MSAS sought to argue (relying
on Connaught) that WCS did not apply to its third-party action against Asiana
because it was an action by one carrier against another. Id. at 956. The court
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Searching for a Ratio in Mitchell

In Mitchell, the plaintiff shipper contracted with Air Express
International, Inc. (Air Express) to transport a crankshaft from
London to New York.171 In New York, the carrier’s ground handler, Triangle Aviation Services, Inc. (Triangle), damaged the
crankshaft in the process of off-loading it.172 The plaintiff sued
Air Express “one day shy” of the Warsaw Convention’s two-year
limitation period, and the defendant then promptly filed a
third-party action against Triangle, albeit outside the two-year
limit of the Warsaw Convention.173 Triangle sought dismissal on
the grounds that the time limitation of the Warsaw Convention
applied to the third-party action.174
Mitchell is—to put it mildly—something of an oddity. While
agreeing with Split End and Data General, which had all applied
the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions, Judge Kram essentially tried to do the impossible. She simultaneously decided
not to apply the Warsaw Convention to the third-party action involved in her case.175 In addition, she sought to accept Connaught, but only on very limited grounds.176
disagreed, rejecting the contention that “indemnity actions between carriers are
not subject to the two-year limitations period under the Warsaw Convention.” Id.
171 Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 525–26. Judge Kram summarized the issue as: “[W]hether the twoyear limitation of the Convention also governs an action by a carrier for indemnification against its agent, an independent contractor, when the agent is not a
carrier.” Id. at 525.
175 Id. at 526, 528.
176 Id. at 527. Judge Kram accepted Connaught, but only insofar as it held that
the Warsaw Convention did not apply to claims between contracting carriers. Id. On
this narrow reading, the Split End decision was not in conflict because it had not
applied the Warsaw Convention to a claim between contracting carriers; Split End
involved third-party actions between a contracting carrier and an actual carrier
and its GHA. Split End Ltd. v. Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1506,
1986 WL 2199, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1986). Nor was Connaught applicable to
the facts of Mitchell because Mitchell involved a third-party action between a carrier and its ground handling agent (i.e., it was not a claim between contracting
carriers). Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525. Judge Kram was thus able to distinguish
Connaught. Id. at 527. However, the problem with this approach is that Judge
Kram tries to accept the holding of Connaught without its ratio. On the narrowest
reading of Connaught, Judge Kram is right—the Warsaw Convention does not
apply between contracting carriers. Connaught involved a case of successive carriage,
so the court was not asked to rule on the applicability of the Warsaw Convention
on a claim between a contracting carrier and a préposé. Connaught Labs. Ltd. v.
Air Can. (1978), 94 D.L.R. 3d 586, 586 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). However, the
Connaught court based its holding on a broader reasoning that regarded the War-
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Judge Kram justified her approach by simply distinguishing
the cases; in essence, she made a special exception.177 Although
premised on a false distinction, Judge Kram inadvertently revealed the truth behind them all in attempting to distinguish
between the cases. Unlike Split End and Data General, the court
in Mitchell attempted to establish something approaching a ratio
decidendi, albeit one that proved utterly unsatisfactory but is
nonetheless revealing.178 Unfortunately, Judge Kram’s opinion
in Mitchell places several hurdles in the path to substantiating its
ratio; not only does it contain several errors, but it also employs a
confusing looseness in terminology.179
In Mitchell, Judge Kram quoted from Reed II and noted that
the Second Circuit had applied the Warsaw Convention’s limitations to avoid the circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s
liability limit and prevent the undermining of the Warsaw Consaw Convention as only applying to claims between passengers (or shippers) and
carriers. Id. at 593–94. In other words, the court held that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to any other actions, including third-party actions. Id. This
broader holding would conflict with the precedent of the New York courts, where
the Warsaw Convention had been applied to actions between contracting carriers
and actual carriers, and between contracting carriers and the GHA of an actual
carrier, such as Split End and Data General. Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *1, 6; Data
Gen. Corp. v. Air Express Int’l Co., 676 F. Supp. 538, 538–39, 541 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
It also conflicts with Mitchell because this was a claim by a carrier against its GHA.
See Connaught, 94 D.L.R. 3d at 588; Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 527–28. One cannot
accept the holding in Connaught—even where narrowly construed—without accepting the broader rationale.
177 See also Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. United Airlines, Inc., 773 F. Supp.
1117, 1119–20 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (applying the same special exception as Mitchell
and refusing to apply the Warsaw Convention to a third-party action by a carrier
against its GHA).
178 Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 527–28.
179 For example, Judge Kram stated in reference to Split End and other cases:
“Unlike these cases, however, third-party defendant Triangle is not an air carrier,
but a ground handler.” Id. at 526 (referring to, inter alia, Split End, 1986 WL 2199,
at *1; Data Gen., 676 F. Supp. at 538–39). This was wrong; there were two thirdparty defendants in Split End, one of them was an actual carrier (i.e., Kuwait Airways), but the other was the ground handling agent of the actual carrier (i.e., Aer
Lingus). See Split End, 1986 WL 2199, at *1. Although Aer Lingus is best known as
an air carrier, it was not operating as a carrier in this case but as the ground
handling agent of Kuwait Airways. See id. Indeed, Judge Kram noted this at other
points in the judgment. See Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 527 (“In Split End, the third
party action was initiated by a freight forwarder against the carrier and its ground
operations agent.”). At another point, Judge Kram described the holding in Split
End as “the Convention applied to indemnity actions by a non-carrier agent
against the actual carrier.” Id. at 527 n.4. However, Dimerco was the third-party
plaintiff in Split End—it was the principal, not the agent. Split End, 1986 WL 2199,
at *1.
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vention’s goals of uniform treatment of carrier liability.180 Judge
Kram claimed that Data General and Split End had likewise been
concerned with avoiding circumvention of the Warsaw Convention.181 In her view, Mitchell was distinguishable because “[t]he
Convention’s limitation on carrier liability would not be circumvented if the Convention is not applied to this indemnification
action.”182 In terms of outcome, this is absolutely right. Because
the Warsaw Convention had been applied to the main action
against the carrier, whatever liability was sought by way of indemnification against the third-party defendant could not be
more than what was permitted under the Warsaw Convention.183
At base, it seems that Judge Kram’s purported ratio was that if
the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability is not at risk of
circumvention by the third-party action, then there is no need to
apply the Warsaw Convention to that action.184
However, one of the problems with Judge Kram’s reasoning is
that there was no risk of circumvention in L.B. Smith, Split End,
or Data General; or to be precise, there was no risk of circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability. In those
cases, the only circumvention directly at issue was the time limits
for bringing a claim under the Warsaw Convention.185 Because
180 Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 526–27 (quoting Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1977) (“The Second Circuit has explained: ‘If this method of circumventing
the Convention’s liability limitation [by suing an employee of an airline] is accepted, not only will the purpose of defining the limits of the carrier’s obligations
be circumvented, but in the process the Convention’s most fundamental objective of providing a uniform system of liability and litigation rules for international
air disasters will be abandoned as well.’”).
181 Id. at 527 (“A close look at Reed, Data General Corp., Split End, and similar
cases reveals that the courts primarily have been concerned with preventing shippers and passengers from circumventing the Convention’s liability limit and its
two-year time limit.”).
182 Id. (Judge Kram referring to the concerns raised by “Reed, Data General
Corp., Split End, and similar cases,” but distinguishing Mitchell by stating that
“[s]uch concerns are not compelling here.”).
183 Id. (“The Convention’s limitation on carrier liability would not be circumvented if the Convention is not applied to this indemnification action. Instead,
the upper limit of the third-party defendant’s liability in this indemnity action is
the Convention’s liability limitation that applies to the main action. By allowing
this indemnification action to proceed, this Court ensures that the carrier’s liability will be appropriately limited, within the liability parameters of the Convention, by its actual fault, if any.”).
184 Id.
185 To be fair, Judge Kram did note that circumvention of time limits was at
issue in these cases. Id. (“A close look at Reed, Data General Corp., Split End, and
similar cases reveals that the courts primarily have been concerned with preventing shippers and passengers from circumventing the Convention’s liability limit
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the main actions in L.B. Smith, Split End, and Data General were
all taken by shippers against contracting carriers, those actions
would have been subject to the Warsaw Convention, so any liability sought to be reallocated via the third-party action for contribution would, as a consequence, have been subjected to the
Warsaw Convention’s provisions of monetary limitation.186
If we continue to examine the basis for Judge Kram’s ratio, we
find that her perception of there being no risk of circumvention
of the Warsaw Convention’s monetary limitation was based on
the notion of a non-carrier agent. L.B. Smith, Split End, and Data
General all involved third-party actions taken by a carrier (the
contracting carrier) against a préposé, specifically an actual carrier.187 Mitchell involved a third-party action by a carrier (who
and its two-year time limit.”) (emphasis added). But, Judge Kram then seems to
have turned a blind eye to this and focused exclusively on circumvention of the
monetary limitation for her ratio.
186 This is well illustrated by Swiss Bank Corp. v. First National City Bank, 1979
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12472 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1979). Swiss Bank had consigned shipments of gold coins to First National City Bank, who was to deliver them to Metropolitan Rare Coin Exchange, Inc. once First National had received payment
from Metropolitan to the favor of the consignee, i.e., Swiss Bank. Id. at *1–2. In
practice, the coins were just delivered over to Metropolitan without first confirming a deposit. Id. The seventh shipment was 142kg of gold, worth U.S. $637,000.
Id. Again, the shipment was delivered to Metropolitan without first receiving a
deposit. Id. Unfortunately, Metropolitan went out of business before it made any
deposit. Id. Swiss Bank sued Swiss Air and First National. Id. Swiss Air settled with
Swiss Bank for U.S. $3,355, i.e., its maximum liability under the Warsaw Convention. Id. at *3. First National brought a third-party action for contribution against
Swiss Air for whatever liability it ended up owing to Swiss Bank. Id. at *7. Swiss Air
successfully petitioned the court to dismiss First National’s third-party action. See
id. at *14. The court held that federal law imposed the limitation of liability (i.e.,
as a treaty of the land), and that “[a]ny further contribution to Swiss Bank,
whether direct or indirect . . . would exceed this limit.” Id. at *10. Absent proof of
Swiss Air being guilty of willful misconduct, its limitation of liability under the
Warsaw Convention represented the maximum it could be held to pay in contribution. See id. at *10 n.6. First National attempted to argue that under the applicable New York rules as to contribution (i.e., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(a)
(McKinney 1978)), Swiss Air’s settlement automatically reduced First National’s
potential liability to Swiss Bank to the extent of Swiss Air’s equitable share of the
damages. See id. at *12. The court explained that this “could not be construed to
mean any amount greater than the maximum liability permitted by law.” Id. at
*13. In other words, the liability that Swiss Air owed by law, i.e., under the Warsaw
Convention, was its equitable share, and First National was potentially liable for
the remainder of the U.S. $637,000.
187 See MANKIEWICZ, supra note 56, at 38 (“The carrier who performs the carriage on behalf of the contracting carrier is, as the case may be, his servant or
agent, the préposé in civil law countries . . . or the actual carrier under the Guadalajara Convention.”).
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was both the contracting and actual carrier) against its préposé,
specifically its own ground handling agent.188 Judge Kram distinguished these factual scenarios with the notion of a non-carrier
agent, by which it is clear she meant an agent who is not itself a
carrier.189 She held that the Warsaw Convention does not need
to apply to a third-party action by a carrier against a non-carrier
agent.190 She could seemingly explain why the Warsaw Convention was applied in Data General and Split End by pointing to the
distinguishing feature that the third-party action was against a
carrier agent in those cases.191 This, it is submitted, is a false
distinction. It is a purely descriptive distinction without a legal
basis in the Warsaw Convention.
The distinction between a carrier agent and a non-carrier
agent is one that could be made—but really should not be—if
you have ratified the Guadalajara Convention and the Hague
Protocol, or MC99; in other words, if you have adopted the concept of an actual carrier and all other préposés of a carrier.192 In
that case, one could refer to an actual carrier as a carrier agent
(i.e., of the contracting carrier) and all other préposés as noncarrier agents (whether they be agents of the actual or contracting carrier). However, you cannot adopt this understanding
if you follow Reed II because it is committed to the singular concept of a carrier as including its préposés.193 Being a non-carrier
agent does not stop you from being a préposé, and, where one
adheres to Reed II, if you are the préposé of a carrier, then the
Warsaw Convention contemplates you as included in the meaning of carrier and it therefore applies.
Another problem with Mitchell is that it is irreconcilable with
Split End. Judge Kram had distinguished Split End and Data General because those cases involved actions against carriers.194 However, Split End also involved a claim between a carrier and a
GHA.195 There were two third-party defendants in Split End; one
was the actual carrier, or, to use Judge Kram’s terminology, a
carrier agent. The other was the actual carrier’s préposé (specifiMitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 525.
Id. at 526 (“[T]hird-party defendant Triangle is not an air carrier, but a
ground handler. Instead, the third-party plaintiff is the carrier.”).
190 Id. at 527.
191 Id.
192 See supra text accompanying note 75.
193 See Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
194 Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 526.
195 Split End Ltd. v. Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1506, 1986 WL
2199, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1986).
188
189
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cally a GHA), thus a non-carrier agent.196 Judge Kram’s non-carrier agent logic would be consistent with the Split End court
applying the Warsaw Convention to the third-party action
against the carrier agent but would not be consistent with the
Split End court applying the Warsaw Convention to the thirdparty action against the GHA.197
Even assuming we accept the distinction and apply the notion
of a non-carrier agent, we find ourselves at a logical impasse.
The defendants in Reed II were senior managers of the airline
and thus préposés (or, in Judge Kram’s terms, we might cram into
them under the notion of non-carrier agents), but the Second
Circuit maintained in Reed II that the Warsaw Convention applies to actions taken against préposés because they are to be
deemed covered by the definition of carrier.198 Yet, Judge Kram
tells us that such préposés are non-carrier agents and, at least
where they are sued by a carrier, that the Warsaw Convention
does not apply to them.199 Presumably, where the passenger or
Id.
One could try to argue that Reed II only applies the Warsaw Convention to
carriers (i.e., contracting carriers) and préposés of carriers, but does not apply to
an agent of the carrier, e.g., the GHA of an actual carrier. However, this would fly
in the face of the Reed II court’s efforts to avoid circumvention since it would
allow a plaintiff to sue the agent of an agent outside the Warsaw Convention. We
can, therefore, reject that explanation. In the only case which could be found on
the issue, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the same as
Split End and Mitchell) applied the Warsaw Convention. See Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 13 F. Supp. 2d 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Plaintiff
Waxman was on a flight from Newark, New Jersey, to Cancun, Mexico, with the
defendant airline when he was stuck in the leg by a hypodermic needle protruding from the seat directly in front of him. Id. at 510. The cleaning services had
been provided in Newark by Signature Flight Support under a contract between
Mexicana and Lufthansa, the latter having subcontracted Signature. Id. Plaintiff
argued that the Warsaw Convention only protected carriers and their agents/
servants. See id. at 511. In this case, that meant Mexicana and Lufthansa. See id.
However, the plaintiff disputed the application of the Warsaw Convention to the
subcontracted agent of Lufthansa, Signature. See id. at 512–13. The court quoted
the plaintiffs: “In other words, according to the Waxmans, ‘no Federal Court in
this Circuit has ever held that an entity which is neither an agent of nor in privity
of contract with the carrier may invoke the liability limitations of the Warsaw
Convention.’” Id. at 513. The court disagreed, stating that “it would be elevating
form over substance to hold that parties to valid subcontracting agreements with
a covered entity are not similarly protected from unlimited liability under the
Convention.” Id. The court supported its decision by reference to Reed v. Wiser
and its rationale of preventing circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s limits.
See id. at 514 (“Simply put, the failure to extend liability limitations to subcontractors would subvert the Convention’s aims in exactly the same fashion.”).
198 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1081, 1092.
199 Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 527.
196
197
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shipper directly sued the non-carrier agent—who, let us be
clear, is a préposé—Judge Kram would have applied the Warsaw
Convention (as per Reed II) because not to do so would risk circumvention. But why should the Warsaw Convention apply in
one case but not in the other? Judge Kram’s only explanation is
the risk of circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s monetary
limitation.200 This is the crux of the whole matter.
The courts in L.B. Smith, Split End, and Data General all applied
the Warsaw Convention because they were compelled to do so
in light of the rationale in Reed II—i.e., the Warsaw Convention
applies to any claim against a carrier or its préposé arising out of
damage covered by the Warsaw Convention, irrespective of who
the plaintiff is.201 They did not apply the Warsaw Convention
because they feared direct circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability in the case at bar; instead, they
were concerned about the hypothetical inverse situation. They
were concerned with the situation where a plaintiff might
choose to sue the préposé, not the contracting carrier.202 Their
thought process was as follows: If we don’t apply the Convention
to the third-party action against the préposé, then how can we
justify applying it in a direct action against the préposé? If Reed II
tells us that we must apply it in the main action, then we have to
apply it to the third-party action, too; otherwise, it will create
conflict with Reed II.
In Mitchell, Judge Kram took L.B. Smith, Split End, and Data
General at face value. She, it seems, did not direct her attention
to the hypothetical case of the plaintiff taking a direct action
against the préposé and, therefore, concluded that there was no
risk of circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of
liability.203 Commendably, Judge Kram sought (intentionally or
not) to chart a course away from Reed II for a small, exceptional
class of cases.204 Most likely, she was motivated to do so because
of the obvious inequity of preventing a defendant from seeking
contribution against a third-party defendant because they were
unable to file their complaint on time because the plaintiff to
the main action had left their action to the very last moment. In
Id.
See L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp., 488 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985); Data Gen. Corp. v. Air Express Int’l Co., 676 F. Supp. 538, 540–41
(S.D.N.Y 1988); Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1092–93.
202 See L.B. Smith, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
203 Mitchell, 704 F. Supp. at 527.
204 Id.
200
201
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the Author’s view, in terms of the outcome, she was right; the
Warsaw Convention should not apply to third-party actions, but
being unable to overrule Reed II, not to mention the pressure
created by the existence of its progeny (most notably, L.B. Smith,
Split End, and Data General), she was building a house on sand.
3.

The Outliers

A couple of U.S. court cases involving third-party actions
taken against carriers for damages arising out of events covered
by the Warsaw Convention deserve special attention—In re Air
Crash at Agana on August 6, 1997,205 and In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island on October 31, 1999.206 In both cases, the defendants
205 Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1999). The only report
of the case is contained in Andrew J. Harakas, International Case Notes and Commentaries, AVIATION Q., Jan. 1999, at 108, 109–11 (George N. Tompkins, Jr. & Andrew
J. Harakas, eds., 1999). The details provided herein are taken from commentaries
on the case provided by Alan H. Collier & Stephanie N. Brie. Alan H. Collier &
Stephanie N. Brie, The Battle over Air France: Does the Montreal Convention Apply to
Manufacturer Claims for Carrier Indemnity?, in AIRCRAFT BUILDERS COUNCIL, INC. L.
REP. (2010); see also Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability
Law, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 21, 65–66 (2001); Sheila A. Sundvall & Michael C.
Andolina, The Status of Pending Air Carrier Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 167,
175–76 (2001); Barry F. Benson & Jill Dahlmann Rosa, The Status of Pending Air
Carrier Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1367, 1389–93 (2001); Anne M. Huarte,
Korean Air Flight 801: Warsaw and the FTCA, MAGAÑA CATHCART & MCCARTHY
(Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.mcmc-law.com/korean-air-flight-801-warsaw-andthe-ftca/ [https://perma.cc/Y9CC-GHBB]. The basic facts are as follows: Korean
Air Lines Flight 801 crashed short of the runway at Agana Airport in Guam, causing the deaths of 225 people and leaving only twenty-nine survivors. Sundvall &
Andolina, supra, at 175. Various suits were filed in the United States against the
U.S. Government (on account of the alleged negligence of the FAA) and Serco
Management Services (the company that managed the air traffic control tower
on behalf of the FAA). See id. at 175–76. The United States and Serco then
brought contribution and indemnification claims against Korean Air Lines. Id.
For a fuller account of the facts and procedural history, see Benson & Dahlmann
Rosa, supra, at 1389–93.
206 340 F. Supp. 2d 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). This litigation arose from the crash of
EgyptAir Flight 990. Id. at 241. The litigation involved a multitude of plaintiffs
whose actions had been consolidated. Id. The plaintiffs broadly fell into two
groups. One consisted of representatives of the estates of two passengers who had
died in the accident and whose claims were initially made only against EgyptAir.
See id. The other group consisted of the vast majority of plaintiffs who had
brought actions against the airframe manufacturer (Boeing) and a component
manufacturer (Parker Hannifin) but not against EgyptAir. Id. The manufacturing
defendants made cross-claims against each other, and both made third-party actions against EgyptAir for contribution and indemnification. Id. The probable
cause of the accident is the subject of conflicting findings between the investigative authorities of the United States and Egypt. Compare NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD.
(NTSB), PB2002-910401, NTSB/AAB-02/01, DCA00MA006, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
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to the main action (the U.S. State and the Air Traffic Control
providers in In re Air Crash at Agana; manufacturers Boeing Co.
and Parker Hannifin Corp. in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket) had
brought third-party actions for indemnification or contribution
against a carrier (Korean Air Lines in In re Air Crash at Agana
and EgyptAir in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket).207 Both carriers
argued that the Warsaw Convention governed the third-party action and that the U.S. court had no jurisdiction because the
United States was not one of the forums available under Article
28.208
These cases are worthy of special attention for a few reasons.
First, the U.S. district courts involved did not apply the Warsaw
Convention to third-party actions against carriers, even though
the decisions postdate the decisions discussed above (In re Air
Crash at Agana was decided in 1999, and In re Air Crash Near Nantucket was decided in 2004), which had applied the Warsaw Convention.209 The reasoning applied in In re Air Crash at Agana and
In re Air Crash Near Nantucket for not applying the Warsaw ConBRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990, BOEING 767-366ER, SU-GAP, 60 MILES SOUTH OF
NANTUCKET, MASSACHUSETTS, OCTOBER 31, 1999 67 (2002), https://
www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAB0201.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VV4N-KTAB], with EGYPTIAN CIV. AVIATION AUTH., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990, OCTOBER 31, 1999, BOEING 767300ER SU-GAP, ATLANTIC OCEAN – 60 MILES SOUTHEAST OF NANTUCKET ISLAND
142, https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40146942&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Report%20of%20the%20Egyptian%20Civil%20Aviation%20Authority-Master.pdf [https://perma.cc/39TE-ZJ4F]. The NTSB
concluded that the accident’s probable cause was the relief first officer’s control
inputs. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD. (NTSB), supra, at 67. Although the NTSB
did not determine the reasons for the first officer’s actions, some believe it was a
suicide. See Benson & Rosa, supra note 205, at 1377–78. On the other hand, the
Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority concluded that the cause of the accident could
not conclusively be identified and it determined that there was no evidence that
the first officer intentionally dove the airplane into the ocean, but instead, that a
mechanical problem was a “plausible theory that deserves further attention.”
EGYPTIAN CIV. AVIATION AUTH., supra, at 141–42.
207 For details pertaining to the parties in In re Air Crash at Agana on August 6,
1997, see Benson & Dahlmann Rosa, supra note 205, at 1389–90. For details pertaining to the parties in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island on October 31, 1999,
see In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 241.
208 Sundvall & Andolina, supra note 205, at 176 (noting, in regards to In re Air
Crash at Agana, that “Korean Airlines contended that, in cases where the United
States and Serco had been sued by plaintiffs for whom there was no Article 28
jurisdiction in the United States, Serco and the United States should be barred
from seeking contribution and indemnity from Korean Airlines in the U.S.”); In
re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
209 See generally Collier & Brie, supra note 205, at 20–22.
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vention echoed that of the orthodox approach, exemplified by
Connaught.210 Second, whether In re Air Crash at Agana did, or
did not, apply the Warsaw Convention is the subject of some
doubt that needs to be cleared up. Third, in In re Air Crash Near
Nantucket, the court raised a new line of argument about the
nature of a third-party action for contribution or indemnity and
its relationship to the main action—a line of argument that
would reemerge in subsequent cases such as Armavia.211 Lastly,
these cases help demonstrate the uneasiness that exists from the
continued presence of Reed II.
a.

In re Air Crash at Agana

In In re Air Crash at Agana the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that the text of the Warsaw Convention applied exclusively to actions by passengers or
shippers.212 Therefore, an action taken by a manufacturer
against a carrier was not subject to the Warsaw Convention’s
provisions.213 In the court’s view, the third-party action could be
separated from the underlying passenger action, with the result
that while a plaintiff-passenger would not have jurisdiction in
the United States against the carrier, nothing prevented the defendants from bringing their claim for contribution or indemnification against the carrier in the United States.214
210 See generally In re Air Crash at Agana, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237; In re
Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 242; Connaught Labs. Ltd. v. Air Can.
(1978), 94 D.L.R. 3d 586, 593–94 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J).
211 See In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43.
212 See Collier & Brie, supra note 205, at 20.
213 Collier and Brie state:
The [Agana] court interpreted the text of Warsaw to suggest it exclusively concerned itself with suits by passengers and shippers. In
holding the identities of the parties central to the treaty’s interpretation, the court concluded that the manufacturer’s indemnity
claim against the carrier was independent of the underlying passenger’s claim, and therefore not governed by treaty.
Id. Collier and Brie also quote from a brief submitted by the U.S. Government in
In re Air Crash at Agana:
The United States was also a party in the [Agana] litigation and
argued in opposition to KAL’s motion to dismiss that “[n]othing in
the Convention covers, or was intended to cover, claims between
carriers and third parties such as the United States or manufacturers, whether the carriers are in the position of plaintiffs, defendants, or intervenors.”
Id. at 21.
214 See Rodriguez, supra note 205, at 66.
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Having concluded that the Warsaw Convention did not apply
to the third-party action, the court also stated that the contribution or indemnity for which the airline could be liable would be
limited to the same extent as it would in passenger actions.215
This appears to be inconsistent with the non-applicability of the
Warsaw Convention to the third-party action. How is it possible
that the Warsaw Convention would not apply to the third-party
action insofar as jurisdiction was concerned but would for limiting liability? Finding an answer to this question is made more
difficult by the absence of a case report. However, the commentary on the case is enlightening. In their article, Collier and Brie
attempted to account for this inconsistency by arguing that the
court in In re Air Crash at Agana reached this holding on a “perceived misapplication” of the Sixth Circuit’s judgment in Polec v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc.216 They stated that the court In re Air Crash
at Agana “read Polec to say that because a passenger’s recovery
could not exceed the liability limit of Warsaw, that limit also restricts the potential recovery of a manufacturer by indemnity.”217
This is a correct reading of Polec, so where is the perceived
misapplication?
The court in In re Air Crash at Agana may have correctly understood the point being made (obiter dictum) in Polec, and, at
least on this point, there was no perceived misapplication. In
Polec, the third-party plaintiff had been permitted to recover in
full because the carrier, the third-party defendant, had been
guilty of willful misconduct (one of the permitted grounds upon
which the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability can be broken).218 However, the Polec court had commented that if the
limit of liability had applied, this limit would have restricted the
third-party plaintiff’s recovery against the carrier or third-party
defendant.219 Although obiter, the court seems to strongly suggest that the court would have applied the Warsaw Convention’s
215 Sundvall & Andolina, supra note 205, at 176 (“The court . . . held that the
indemnity claims were independent of the passenger claims and therefore not
governed by the requirements of Article 28. However, the court recognized that
the third-party indemnity claim must be limited by the Convention to the extent
that the carrier’s liability would be limited in claims brought by passengers under
the Convention.”); cf. Benson & Dahlmann Rosa, supra note 205, at 1390.
216 See Collier & Brie, supra note 205, at 20 (referring to Polec v. Nw. Airlines,
86 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 1996)).
217 Id.
218 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 25.
219 Polec, 86 F.3d at 544 (“If Northwest committed ‘only’ ordinary negligence,
the international travel[ ]ers’ recovery may not exceed the liability limit of the
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limitation of liability to the third-party action in the appropriate
circumstances.220
The problem with Polec is that it was a third-party action based
on subrogation, not contribution.221 The distinction is vital because not all third-party actions are born equal. Subrogation
usually arises in the context of insurance but, more generally,
may arise wherever one party indemnifies another against an injury suffered at the hands of a third party.222 In simple terms,
subrogation operates to grant the indemnifier the right to step
into the shoes of the indemnified in order to exercise any
cause(s) of action vested in the indemnified against the third
party in respect of the loss indemnified against.223 This is the
vital point to note—the indemnifier (i.e., the subrogor) is not
granted a cause of action against the third party; instead—by
operation of law—the indemnifier is recognized as being entitled to exercise the cause of action of the injured party (i.e., the
subrogee) against the third party.224 The subrogated action is
Warsaw Convention, and this liability limit restricts McDonnell Douglas’s potential recovery.”).
220 See id. at 544.
221 Unlike in In re Air Crash at Agana on August 6, 1997, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL
No. 1237 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1999), jurisdiction was not at issue in Polec. See Collier
& Brie, supra note 205, at 20. Furthermore, the third-party plaintiff’s contribution
claims had been rejected because there was no common liability involved; the
jury had found the carrier 100% liable. See Polec, 86 F.3d at 552. The actual basis
of recovery in Polec was a third-party action for equitable subrogation. Id. at 513.
This arose because the manufacturer had settled with the plaintiffs and thereby
indemnified them. Id. at 551. However, because the manufacturer was ultimately
not found liable at all, equitable subrogation allowed it to recover these payments. Id.
222 S. R. DERHAM, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE LAW 1 (1985).
223 Id. Lord Cairns summarized it as “[W]here one person has agreed to indemnify another, he will, on making good the indemnity, be entitled to succeed
to all the ways and means by which the person indemnified might have protected
himself against or reimbursed himself for the loss.” Simpson & Co. v. Thomson
[1877] 3 App. Cas. 279 (HL) 284 (appeal taken from Scot.); see JOHN BIRDS, BEN
LYNCH & SIMON MILNES, MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW para. 24-001 (13th ed.
2015) (“In insurance law ‘subrogation’ is the name given to the right of the insurer who has paid a loss to be put in the place of the insured so that he can take
advantage of any means available to the insured to extinguish or diminish the
loss for which the insurer has indemnified the insured.”); see also DERHAM, supra
note 222, at 1; JOHN BIRDS, BIRD’S MODERN INSURANCE LAW 331 (10th ed. 2016).
224 See DERHAM, supra note 222, at 69 (“The doctrine of subrogation does not
confer a new and independent right of action on the insurer, but merely gives it
the benefit of any personal right that the insured himself has against the third
party.”).
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actually taken in the name of the subrogee, not the subrogor.225
This is different from an action for contribution, where the
third-party plaintiff brings an action in their own name against a
third-party defendant.226 This action for contribution is distinct
from—although dependent upon—the cause of action exercised in the main action, whereas, in subrogation, they are one
and the same cause of action. Therefore, applying the Warsaw
Convention to a subrogated cause of action is no different than
it would be to apply it where the cause of action had been exercised directly by the injured party.
Because subrogation was involved and not contribution, Polec
was of no value to In re Air Crash at Agana. Yet, Collier & Brie tell
us that the court in In re Air Crash at Agana had taken a lead
from Polec.227 It appears that the perceived misapplication of
Polec in In re Air Crash at Agana (as understood by Collier & Brie)
relates to the matter of the general applicability of the Warsaw
Convention to third-party actions.228 Collier & Brie state that In
re Air Crash at Agana read Polec as authority for applying only the
monetary limitation of liability, but not the rest of the Warsaw
Convention.229 They argue that the In re Air Crash at Agana court
did not appreciate that in Polec the court had applied the Warsaw Convention generally.230 The limitation of liability had not
applied in Polec precisely because the Warsaw Convention told
the court that it did not apply where the carrier was guilty of
willful misconduct, not because the Warsaw Convention was
inapplicable.231
If the In re Air Crash at Agana court did actually
(mis)understand Polec as authority for applying only the limitation of liability, but not the rest of the Warsaw Convention, then
it was clearly wrong. However, the Author has doubts about this.
225 As Lord Mansfield famously said of subrogation: “Every day the insurer is
put in the place of the insured. . . . The insurer uses the name of the insured.”
Mason v. Sainsbury (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 538, 540 (KB).
226 See Collier & Brie, supra note 205, at 21–22.
227 Id. at 20.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 20–21.
230 Id. at 21 (“[T]he court in Polec generally applied the limitations of Warsaw
to a third-party claim by a manufacturer against a carrier. Although the [Agana]
court relied on Polec in applying the limitations of Warsaw to the liability exposure of a carrier in a third-party action, the court in [Agana] expressly declined to
apply the limitations of Warsaw to jurisdiction over the carrier in a third-party
action.”).
231 See Polec v. Nw. Airlines, 86 F.3d 498, 544 (6th Cir. 1996).
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In the Author’s view, there was a misperception of Polec by the In
re Air Crash at Agana court, but it was not consequential. This is
because it is possible that the court was only making a very general point in In re Air Crash at Agana, one upon which the two
courts were essentially in agreement. What the In re Air Crash at
Agana court may have wished to use Polec for was to bolster the
point that a third-party plaintiff cannot recover more from a
third-party defendant than that defendant would have been liable for in a direct action taken by the plaintiff (e.g., the passenger). This much is true of both cases. One can imagine that the
third-party defendants in In re Air Crash at Agana were stressing
the need to apply the Warsaw Convention to the third-party action to avoid circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability. In response, the court was pointing out that
there was no risk of circumvention. However, what was misperceived was the basis for not applying the limitation of liability
in both cases. In other words, what was elided was the distinction between subrogation and contribution.
If the court in In re Air Crash at Agana was saying that if the
passenger could only have recovered a limited amount from the
carrier in a direct action under the Warsaw Convention, then, in
any a third-party action for indemnification or contribution, the
third-party plaintiff could not gain contribution in excess of that
amount. Descriptively speaking, one could say this makes the
Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability applicable to a thirdparty action. Still, legally speaking, it is not the Warsaw Convention that is being applied, but rather the doctrine of contribution or indemnification that typically permits the third-party
defendant to rely upon any defenses or limitations that it would
have had in a direct action by the plaintiff to the main action.232
Assuming this to be the substance of the doctrine of contribution applicable by the court in In re Air Crash at Agana, then it
seems that the court was only stating the obvious. It was not stating that the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability was applicable to the third-party action, but simply noting that where
contribution is sought, the third-party defendant is entitled to
rely upon defenses or limitations that would have been applicable in a direct action. The Warsaw Convention applies de facto
to the third-party action only because of its de jure applicability
232 Indeed, the United Kingdom’s Civil Liability (Contribution) Act applies a
similar principle. See Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, (1978) § 2(3), 47 CURRENT LAW (UK).
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to the main action; one might say that it is indirectly or reflexively applicable.
While it cannot be said conclusively, it seems more likely that
In re Air Crash at Agana stands for the general non-applicability
of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions.
b.

In re Air Crash Near Nantucket

Turning now to the other outlier case, in In re Air Crash Near
Nantucket, the plaintiffs broadly fell into two groups.233 One
group consisted of the representatives of the estates of two passengers who had died in the accident and whose claims were
made against EgyptAir.234 The other group consisted of plaintiffs who had brought actions against the airframe manufacturer
(Boeing Co.) and a component manufacturer (Parker Hannifin
Corp.), but not against EgyptAir.235 These manufacturer defendants then brought contribution or indemnification actions
against EgyptAir.236
The plaintiffs’ claims against EgyptAir were not actionable in
the United States due to a lack of jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention.237 EgyptAir sought to rely on this lack of jurisdiction to dismiss the third-party actions against it, arguing that its
liability concerning these claims was coextensive with its liability
toward the passengers under the Warsaw Convention.238
EgyptAir maintained that it would circumvent the Warsaw Convention if the manufacturing defendants could establish jurisdiction over the carrier in the United States in circumstances
where the plaintiff-passenger could not.239 EgyptAir’s logic was
that the third-party action was derivative of the main action to
233 See In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island on October 31, 1999, 340 F. Supp.
2d 240, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
234 See id. Initially, the plaintiffs only claimed against EgyptAir but subsequently
joined Boeing and Parker Hannifin as defendants. Id. at 242 n.3.
235 Id. at 242.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. (“EgyptAir reasons that permitting Boeing and Parker Hannifin to recover via contribution or indemnity against EgyptAir would allow recovery on the
passenger claims to be indirectly imposed against EgyptAir in the United States,
when such recovery could not be directly imposed.”). EgyptAir also stressed that
the Warsaw Convention’s goals of uniformity and limiting carrier ability would be
undermined if it could be made indirectly liable to passenger claims via actions
for contribution or indemnification. See id. at 243.
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the extent that both were to be seen as two sides of the same
coin.240
The manufacturing defendants counterargued that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to their claims against the carrier
because the Warsaw Convention was solely directed at regulating the legal relationship between the carrier and the passenger
or shipper.241 Boeing also noted that its claim was founded on
“separate contractual obligations” that were “voluntarily assumed” by EgyptAir in the aircraft purchase agreement.242 The
thrust of this point is that the origin of Boeing’s cause of action
was by way of contractual indemnity rather than by operation of
law and was, therefore, legally distinguishable from the underlying passenger action.243 As noted earlier, a distinction must be
See id.
Id. at 242–43. Boeing relied on the Minutes of the Warsaw Convention for
support, contending that the drafters had only intended the Warsaw Convention
to regulate the legal relationship between the carrier and the passenger and not
that between the carrier and other parties. See id. The reference was to the comments of the Rapporteur, which provided:
Before examining the articles of the preliminary draft, it is important to bring out that in this matter an international agreement can
only be reached if it is limited to certain determined problems. The
text applies, therefore, only to the contract of carriage in its formal
appearances first of all, and in the legal relationships which arise
between the carrier and the persons carried or the people who
ship.
WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH, supra note 67, at 246.
242 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43. A couple of subsidiary points were made by the manufacturing defendants. Boeing argued
[T]hat the purpose of the Convention was to create a quid pro quo
between carriers and passengers, in which passengers recover damages without the need to prove the carrier’s negligence, but in return have a cap placed on their recovery. . . . It notes that no such
quid pro quo was contemplated by the Convention as to
manufacturers.
Id. at 243 (citation omitted). Parker Hannifin made the point that “while the four
fora are clearly designed to have a connection with carriers and passengers, they
do not provide a forum that would necessarily have any connection to the manufacturer, as the present case illustrates.” Id.
243 The origin of Parker Hannifin’s claim is subject to some residual doubt.
The court did note that “the contribution and contractual indemnity claims are
based on Boeing and Parker Hannifin’s legal and equitable relationships with
EgyptAir.” Id. at 244. This suggests that Parker Hannifin also had a contractual
indemnity but we cannot be sure without further details. Certainly, both thirdparty plaintiffs would have had a common law right to claim indemnification/
contribution. See Collier & Brie, supra note 205, at 29. Boeing certainly had a
contractual indemnity, but we cannot be certain whether Parker Hannifin (a
component manufacturer) did.
240
241
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maintained between contractual indemnities and a right to contribution or indemnification as arises by law; this will be addressed in the Conclusion to this Article.
The In re Air Crash Near Nantucket court referred to In re Air
Crash at Agana approvingly, stating, “[t]he identity of the parties
is central to the Convention.”244 The court continued by stating
that “[t]he express purpose of the Convention was to regulate
litigation between passengers and carriers”245 and noting that
the “[Warsaw] Convention is silent as to contribution and indemnification claims between manufacturers and carriers.”246
The In re Air Crash Near Nantucket court concluded that “to apply
the Convention to contribution and indemnity claims of manufacturers would expand the reach of the Convention beyond its
intended scope.”247 The practical result of which meant that the
third-party plaintiffs’ actions were not preempted by the Warsaw
Convention’s jurisdictional provisions and could be brought in
the United States.
As for EgyptAir’s argument that the manufacturing defendants’ claims were coextensive with the underlying passenger actions, the court was forthright in its rejection. The court took
the view that the manufacturing defendants’ “contribution and
contractual indemnity claims” were based on “legal and equitable relationships with EgyptAir . . . distinct from any passenger
claim.”248 As shown in Part III of this Article, the court was right
in its conclusion. However, there is a problem with how the In re
Air Crash Near Nantucket court justified its view.
The court relied on the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., where it permitted a third-party action against the backdrop of a statute that—
similarly to the Warsaw Convention—provided a limitation of
liability and an exclusive remedy for an injured party against its
employer.249 In Ryan, the employer was the third-party defenIn re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
Id. (citing El Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 171–72 (1999)
(“[T]he convention addresses and concerns, only and exclusively, the airline’s
liability for passenger injuries occurring ‘on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.’”)).
246 Id. at 244. The court also referred to the Minutes of Warsaw Convention for
support. See id. at 243–44 (citing WARSAW MINUTES ENGLISH, supra note 67, at
246).
247 Id. at 244.
248 Id.
249 Id. See generally Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atl. S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956). In Ryan, a longshoreman (also known as a stevedore) had been compen244
245
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dant to a claim for contribution or indemnification made by a
third-party plaintiff who the employee in the main action had
sued.250 The difficulty with Ryan, for In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, is that Ryan was decided on the basis of a contractual indemnity only.251 In other words, the third-party defendant’s duty
to indemnify the third-party plaintiff arose from a freely given
contractual indemnity; it did not arise by force of law, e.g., as
arises between joint tortfeasors. The Court determined that the
statute did not in any way restrict the power of the parties to
agree to such a contractual indemnity, confirming that the
cause of action based on the contractual indemnity was legally
distinct from the underlying liability owed by the third-party defendant to the injured party.252 What Ryan did not address—the
sated by their employer (Ryan Stevedoring Co.) for injuries sustained due to negligence imputed to the employer. Id. at 126–28. Under the Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905, Ryan Stevedoring Co.’s liability was limited to approximately $13,000. Id. at 128. Subsequently,
the injured longshoreman sued the shipowner (Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.) and was
awarded $75,000. Id. The shipowner then turned to Ryan Stevedoring, seeking
contribution/indemnification. Id. Ryan Stevedoring argued that its liability to the
injured employee was exclusive and pre-empted the shipowner’s claims to contribution/indemnification. Id. In other words, Ryan Stevedoring sought to maintain
that the two claims were effectively one and the same. While the Supreme Court’s
decision allowed the shipowner to recover an indemnity, the basis for that was
contractual, not tort. Id. at 131–32. Ryan Stevedoring had given a contractual
indemnity to the shipowner whereby it committed to hold the shipowner harmless from the consequences of Ryan Stevedoring’s negligence. Id. at 130.
250 Id. at 127.
251 Id. at 131–32 (“The shipowner’s action here is not founded upon a tort or
upon any duty which the stevedoring contractor owes to its employee. The thirdparty complaint is grounded upon the contractor’s breach of its purely consensual obligation owing to the shipowner to stow the cargo in a reasonably safe
manner.”). Interestingly, the court in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island on October 31, 1999, 340 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) also cited Triguero v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 932 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1991). While it seems that Triguero was
cited in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket to bolster Ryan with a Second Circuit authority because In re Air Crash Near Nantucket was an E.D.N.Y. case, Triguero concerned the same statute (i.e., LHWCA), and had facts very similar to those of
Ryan. See Triguero, 932 F.2d at 97. Most interestingly, the Second Circuit in
Triguero actually applied the LHWCA to pre-empt a non-contractual third-party action. See id. at 98–99 (citing Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir.
1978); Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545 F.2d 836, 839–40 (2d Cir. 1976)). Indeed, in
Triguero the court determined there was no contractual indemnity. Id. at 102.
Therefore, Triguero reached a decision on the matter which the Supreme Court
had left unanswered in Ryan, i.e., whether LHWCA pre-empted non-contractual
claims for indemnification or contribution. Id. Unfortunately, this aspect of
Triguero was not addressed specifically in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket.
252 Ryan, 350 U.S. at 130 (“In the face of a formal bond of indemnity this statute clearly does not cut off a shipowner’s right to recover from a bonding com-
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Court specifically leaving this issue open—was whether the statute would have preempted a noncontractual claim to indemnification or contribution.253
The difficulty for In re Air Crash Near Nantucket is that it involved, not only claims based on contractual indemnity, but also
ones based on common law.254 Ryan only provides an answer to
the former, not the latter.255 It is not entirely clear what the In re
Air Crash Near Nantucket court’s intention was. Did it understand
Ryan as authority for a wider proposition, i.e., that third-party
actions, whether contractual or non-contractual, are legally distinct from the underlying actions upon which liability in the
main action is established? If so, then In re Air Crash Near Nantucket’s reliance on Ryan was misplaced because the U.S. Supreme Court left the status of noncontractual third-party actions
undecided in Ryan. Alternatively, provided both Boeing and
Parker Hannifin had contractual indemnities from EgyptAir, the
court may have, like the Supreme Court in Ryan, regarded the
preemptive effect on any noncontractual causes of action for
contribution or indemnification as moot. In either case, In re Air
Crash Near Nantucket cannot provide us with an authoritative answer on this point.
A final salient feature of In re Air Crash Near Nantucket is that
the case report tells us that EgyptAir had “relied heavily” on Reed
II.256 Unfortunately, the carrier’s argument is not presented in
the report. Still, it is most likely that EgyptAir argued that the
court ought to apply the Warsaw Convention to the third-party
action because, if it did not, the Warsaw Convention would be
circumvented, as would have happened in Reed II if the court
pany the reimbursement that the indemnitor, for good consideration, has
expressly contracted to pay. Such a liability springs from an independent contractual right. It is not an action by or on behalf of the employee and it is not one to
recover damages ‘on account of’ an employee’s ‘injury or death.’ It is a simple
action to recover, under a voluntary and self-sufficient contract, a sum measured
by foreseeable damages occasioned to the shipowner by the injury or death of a
longshoreman on its ship.”).
253 Id. at 142 n.6 (“We do not reach the issue of the exclusionary effect of the
Compensation Act upon a right of action of a shipowner under comparable circumstances without reliance upon an indemnity or service agreement of a stevedoring contractor.”).
254 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
255 See Collier & Brie, supra note 205, at 22 (“This reasoning explains the
court’s decision to not apply Warsaw to a third-party claim for contractual indemnity, but does not necessarily provide support for equitable indemnity outside the
Convention.”).
256 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 244.

2022]

WISE UP!

61

had not therein applied the Warsaw Convention.257 This put the
In re Air Crash Near Nantucket court in a tight spot. How could
avoiding circumvention be grounds for applying the Warsaw
Convention in Reed II but not in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket?
The In re Air Crash Near Nantucket court elected to distinguish
Reed II. The principal basis upon which the In re Air Crash Near
Nantucket court relied to distinguish the cases was that the Second Circuit in Reed II applied the Warsaw Convention to the
main action (i.e., between the plaintiff and the carrier’s préposés). In contrast, the parties in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket
accepted that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to the main
action (i.e., between the plaintiffs and the manufacturing defendants).258 Instead, EgyptAir asked that the court apply the
Warsaw Convention to the recourse action (i.e., the manufacturing defendants against EgyptAir).259 Furthermore, the court
noted that the plaintiffs in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket were
not—unlike the plaintiffs in Reed II—attempting to circumvent
the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability.260 Here is what
the court stated:
In the present case, EgyptAir is not contending that the liability
limitations of the Convention apply to the passengers’ claims
against the manufacturers. While the plaintiffs in Reed were obviously trying to indirectly reach further into the carrier’s pockets
than they would be able to directly reach, here the passengers
(assuming, arguendo, that they succeed on their claims) will be
entitled to the same recovery from the manufacturers regardless
of whether the manufacturers are successful in obtaining contribution and/or indemnity from EgyptAir.261
257 This corresponds with the very brief account given, in In re Air Crash Near
Nantucket, of the holding in Reed II:
Reed involved an attempt by the estates of passengers who perished
in an international air crash to circumvent the Convention’s liability limitations by bringing suit against individual airline employees.
Noting that the “liability limitations of the Convention could then
be circumvented by the simple device of a suit against the pilot
and/or other employees, which would force the American employer . . . to provide indemnity for higher recoveries as the price
for service by employees,” . . . the court held that the Convention’s
liability limitations applied to such claims.
Id. at 244 (quoting Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)).
258 Id. at 244.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
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The court essentially said that the plaintiffs’ full damages were
not dependent on the solvency of the defendant to the main
action; they would recover their full damages from the defendant manufacturers irrespective of the success of the third-party
action against EgyptAir. Whereas, in Reed II, the plaintiffs depended upon the third-party action to secure full damages
(knowing that the carrier’s employees would be unable to satisfy
the judgment).262 This is not a distinction in law but one based
on the purported intentions of the plaintiffs in the two cases.
Just because the plaintiff may not have intended to circumvent
the Warsaw Convention in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket does not
alter that the fact that their actions may result in the Warsaw
Convention’s circumvention.
Secondly, the court’s distinction refers to the circumvention
of the limits of liability.263 This is disingenuous. It seems very
unlikely that EgyptAir was arguing that the limitation of liability
should be applied.264 It was more likely it was making a broader
point that to avoid circumventing the Warsaw Convention, specifically its jurisdictional provisions, the court ought to apply the
Warsaw Convention to the third-party action; to not do so would
effectively allow the plaintiffs to circumvent it. This would suggest that EgyptAir understood that Reed II required that the Warsaw Convention be applied to an action for damages arising
from an event covered by the Warsaw Convention taken against
a carrier, regardless of who the plaintiff is. However, the In re Air
Crash Near Nantucket court had earlier declared that it was imperative that the plaintiff be a passenger or shipper (yet had not
mentioned Reed II in that context).265 As noted in our treatment
of Reed II, this line of argument—although not directly at issue
in Reed II—was opened up by its reasoning and later applied by
its progeny, e.g., L.B. Smith, Split End, and Data General.266 In re
Air Crash Near Nantucket stands in direct opposition with the line
Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1081–82.
See id. at 1092.
264 In their article on the EgyptAir Flight 990 crash, Benson & Dahlmann Rosa
state that EgyptAir had conceded that it was bound by the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) Intercarrier Agreement of 1997, by which it waived
the limit of liability under the Warsaw Convention. Benson & Dahlmann Rosa,
supra note 205, at 1379. In addition, they note that by February 2001, EgyptAir
had announced that it would not contest liability in litigation where jurisdiction
was properly founded in the United States. Id.
265 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43.
266 See generally supra Section II.B.2; L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp.,
488 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Split End Ltd. v. Dimerco Express (Phils)
262
263
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of authority that can be traced back to Reed II. Yet, neither In re
Air Crash Near Nantucket nor In re Air Crash at Agana addressed
this conflict. Indeed, In re Air Crash Near Nantucket avoided it by
distinguishing Reed II on spurious grounds. In re Air Crash at
Agana seemingly did not refer to it whatsoever.267
Although the Author submits that In re Air Crash at Agana and
In re Air Crash Near Nantucket were decided correctly, both failed
to distinguish themselves from the precedents established under
the reasoning first laid down in Reed II. It would seem that the
courts were reluctant to reject Reed II and its progeny expressly.
The result is that there are conflicting decisions in the United
States on the question of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions.268 With no satisfactory conclusion,
the issue has carried over into the litigation of third-party actions under MC99.269
III.

THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS AND MC99: A DIFFERENT
STORY?

MC99 contains two articles directly relating to third-party recourse actions: one regarding any right of recourse against third
parties (Article 37) and the other regarding any right of recourse between contracting and actual carriers (Article 48).270
Article 37 (entitled “Right of Recourse Against Third Parties”)
provides: “Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the question whether a person liable for damage in accordance with its
Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1506, 1986 WL 2199 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1986); Data Gen. Corp. v.
Air Express Int’l Co., 676 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
267 See generally In re Air Crash at Agana, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237; In re
Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d 240.
268 See, e.g., Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1082.
269 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atl. on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d
832, 846–47 (N.D. Cal. 2010). In this case, the court recognized the tension that
exists with respect to third-party actions under MC99:
If Air France can be sued by the Manufacturing Defendants as a
third-party Defendant it creates tension with the MC[99] in two
ways. First, Air France, though a party, would not be presumptively
liable to the Plaintiffs as contemplated by the MC[99].
....
Second, Air France’s presence as a third-party Defendant would undercut the MC[99]’s jurisdictional restrictions because Air France
will end up indirectly litigating the passengers’ claims outside one
of the five forums expressly provided for in the MC[99].
Id.
270 MC99, supra note 10, art. 37.
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provisions has a right of recourse against any other person.”271
Article 37 of MC99 does not create a right of recourse against a
third party; it merely ensures that the existence of such a right
shall not be affected by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.272 Therefore, a third-party plaintiff must rely on le droit commun to find a recourse action.273 Although there is no equivalent
to Article 37 in the Warsaw Convention, the proposition has
been accepted as applying equally to it.274 As noted earlier, a
very similar recourse provision was proposed in the Guatemala
City Protocol of 1971, but this instrument never came into effect.275 That provision eventually made its way into WCS with
MAP4, which was concluded in 1975 but only came into effect in
1998 (the United States acceded to it in 1998).276
Insofar as any right (or obligation) of recourse exists between
carriers, Article 48 provides that the provisions of Chapter V
(entitled “Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the
Contracting Carrier”) shall not affect such right or obligation.277
The substance of Article 48 is that recourse actions between conId.
Chubb II, 634 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While the Montreal Convention does not create a cause of action for indemnification or contribution among
carriers, it does not preclude such actions as may be available under local law.”).
A Kentucky district court held that it “must honor the express provision of Article
37 that a right of recourse against third parties is not prohibited by the Montreal
Convention.” In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., August 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316,
2007 WL 2915187, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2007).
273 See TOMPKINS, supra note 77, at 68 (“The existence and extent of the right of
recourse is determined by applicable local law.”) (citing Sompo Japan Ins. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008)).
274 1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW at VII-241 (J David McClean ed., 2021)
(“Although [Article 37 of MC99] has no counterpart in earlier instruments in the
Warsaw system, the proposition is equally true under those earlier conventions.”).
Several court decisions support this view. See, e.g., Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on
June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503, 516–17 (8th Cir. 2002). In Sompo, the Seventh Circuit
held that WCS (as amended by MAP4) did not preempt the carrier’s right of
recourse. 522 F.3d at 781 (“An air carrier’s right to a setoff or contribution from
a joint tortfeasor is, similarly, incidental to the causes of action available under
the Convention and therefore not subject to its limited preemption.”). The court
also noted that Article 30A expressly contemplates recourse actions, which appeared to show that “the Convention refused explicitly to preempt local contribution schemes.” Id. at 782.
275 See supra Section II.B.1.
276 See Sompo, 522 F.3d at 780–82.
277 MC99, supra note 10, art. 48. “Except as provided in Article 45, nothing in
this Chapter shall affect the rights and obligations of the carriers between themselves, including any right of recourse or indemnification.” Id.
271
272
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tracting and actual carriers are anticipated but not governed by
MC99.278 However, there is one exception. Article 45 provides:
In relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, an
action for damages may be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
against that carrier or the contracting carrier, or against both together or separately.
If the action is brought against only one of those carriers, that carrier
shall have the right to require the other carrier to be joined in the proceedings, the procedure and effects being governed by the law of the court
seised of the case.279

Only the latter half of the provision is of relevance to recourse.
Simply put, it provides that where only one of the carriers is
sued by the plaintiff, that carrier has the right to join the other
carrier in the proceedings. The final part of Article 45 makes it
clear that the procedure and effects of this right of joinder shall
be governed by the lex fori. With the exception of Article 45,
Chapter V of the Warsaw Convention does not affect the rights
or obligations of carriers inter se.280 Just as with the Guadalajara
Convention, the drafters of MC99 were solely concerned with
facilitating recourse actions and not regulating them.281 At the
Montreal Conference, the U.S. Delegate explained that the purpose of Article 48 was to allow “the carriers to work out amongst
themselves issues of indemnification.”282
Given that MC99 is a consolidation of the provisions on recourse from the Guadalajara Convention and MAP4, one would
expect that the question of how MC99 might apply to third-party
actions would follow the precedent set by the WCS cases. The
first cases to address the applicability of MC99 to third-party actions for contribution/indemnification emerged in the United
States and were the subject of two district court cases in 2008
and a third in 2010.283 The first case was Chubb Insurance Co. of
Id.
Id. art. 45 (emphasis added).
280 See id.
281 See supra Section II.B.1.
282 1 INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. [ICAO], Commission of the Whole: Minutes of the
Tenth Meeting, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW (CONVENTION FOR THE
UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR): MONTREAL,
10–28 MAY 1999: MINUTES, 190, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2 (1999).
283 See Chubb I, No. CV 06-7267, 2008 WL 11357925, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Kuehne
& Nagel (AG & Co.) KG, 544 F. Supp. 2d 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Allianz Glob.
278
279
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Europe S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (Chubb I)284 before
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The
second case was American Home Assurance Co. v. Kuehne & Nagel
(AG & Co.) KG285 before the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The third case was Allianz Global Corporate
& Specialty v. EMO Trans California, Inc.286 before the District
Court for the Northern District of California. In each case, the
courts adopted the same perspective on the issue as applied
under WCS: that MC99 applied to third-party actions.287 In
reaching this view, the courts relied heavily on the need to
achieve uniformity.288 However, the proverbial cat was set
Corp. & Specialty v. EMO Trans Cal., Inc., No. C 09-4893, 2010 WL 2594360, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010).
284 Chubb I, 2008 WL 10988806, at *1. In Chubb I, the court applied the time
limitation of the Warsaw Convention to a third-party action brought by a contracting carrier against the actual carrier, referring to authorities for the same
proposition under the Warsaw Convention. Id. at *2 (citing Motorola, Inc. v.
MSAS Cargo Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Air Express Int’l Co., 676 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)); see also
Olaya v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 08-CV-4853, 2009 WL 3242116, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2009) (“Because Olaya’s claims are based upon damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of American’s international shipment of
the cargo, and because the Derisos’ cross-claims for indemnification and contribution arose from the same transaction, all claims against American are governed
exclusively by the Montreal Convention, including the Derisos’ cross-claims.”)
(citing Kuehne & Nagel, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 263).
285 544 F. Supp. 2d 261. Strictly speaking, the court in Kuehne & Nagel did not
have to decide the question of the applicability of MC99 to a claim between a
contracting carrier and an actual carrier because the parties had not contested it.
See id. at 261. However, in the course of its opinion, the court did express its
agreement with Split End that the time limitation would apply in an action between a contracting and actual carrier. See id. at 263 (citing Split End Ltd. v.
Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1506, 1986 WL 2199, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 1986)); see also Allianz, 2010 WL 2594360, at *4.
286 Allianz, 2010 WL 2594360, at *1.
287 See Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *1; Kuehne & Nagel, 544 F. Supp. 2d at
262–66; Allianz, 2010 WL 2594360, at *4–5.
288 Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *4 (“UPS’s proposed rule would destroy
uniformity and predictability in cases involving transport by a carrier other than
the contracting carrier. . . . This outcome would be inconsistent with the Convention’s over-arching purpose of promoting uniformity and predictability.”); Allianz, 2010 WL 2594360, at *4 (“Under EMO’s proposed regime, however, thirdparty claims for indemnity would be governed by the local forum’s rules and time
limitations, eviscerating the uniformity provided by Article 35.”). The courts here
fell into the all too familiar error of failing to note that MC99 (like the Warsaw
Convention) only intended to achieve uniformity of certain rules, not all rules. See,
e.g., Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *3–4. MC99, like the Warsaw Convention
before it, sought to achieve uniformity in the actions between carriers and their
customers, not third parties.
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amongst the pigeons in 2011 when Chubb I reached the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, i.e., Chubb Insurance Co.
of Europe S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (Chubb II).289
A.

A TALE

OF

TWO CHUBBS

The background to the Chubb litigation began when Air New
Zealand Engineering Ltd. contracted with Menlo Worldwide
Forwarding Inc. (Menlo) to transport an aircraft engine from
New Zealand to the United States.290 Menlo (as contracting carrier) contracted Qantas Airways Ltd. (Qantas) to perform the
actual carriage.291 The engine arrived damaged in Los Angeles,
and roughly U.S. $120,000 was paid out by the insurer, Chubb
Insurance Co. of Europe S.A. (Chubb).292 Chubb then brought
a subrogated claim against UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc.
(UPS); UPS had acquired Menlo in the interim, thereby becoming the successor-in-interest.293 The parties reached a settlement
whereby UPS agreed to pay Chubb U.S. $80,000.294 Nearly one
year later, UPS brought third-party actions for indemnification
and contribution against Qantas, alleging that the damage was
solely the result of Qantas’s negligence.295 Qantas maintained
that the two-year limitation period laid down by Article 35(1) of
MC99 had expired when UPS brought the recourse action.296 In
contrast, UPS argued that MC99’s time limit did not apply to the
recourse action.297 At first, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California applied MC99’s time limitation.298 But,
on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision.299
A key feature of Chubb I and Chubb II is that the parties, both
at first instance and on appeal, maintained that MC99 governed
Chubb II, 634 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 1025.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 See id. at 1025–26; Chubb I, No. CV 06-7267, 2008 WL 11357925, at *1–2
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008).
297 See id.
298 Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *4; see also id. at *2 (citing Motorola, Inc. v.
MSAS Cargo Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955–56 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Air Express Int’l Co., 676 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (referring
to WCS precedent which held “there are no exceptions to the two year limitations period”).
299 Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1028.
289
290
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the recourse action between them.300 This is important to note
for two reasons: (1) it was submitted that it was erroneous, and
(2) it painted the courts—particularly the appellate court—into
a corner. Were the court to decide that the time limitation of
MC99 did not apply to the recourse action, then it would have
been faced with maintaining that position while holding to the
parties’ contention that MC99 governed the action. More substantially, it prevented the Ninth Circuit from reaching the conclusion that MC99 does not govern recourse actions. By taking
this as its starting point, the third-party plaintiff (UPS) put itself
in the position of having to explain how MC99 could simultaneously regulate third-party actions yet not apply the time limit of
Article 35.301
In Chubb I, UPS argued that only Chapter V of MC99 (i.e.,
Articles 39 to 48, consisting of special provisions relating to contracting/actual carriers) applied, not the remainder of the Warsaw Convention, e.g., Article 35.302 If only Chapter V applied,
UPS could then point to Article 48 that specifies: “Except as provided in Article 45, nothing in this Chapter shall affect the rights
and obligations of the carriers between themselves, including
any right of recourse or indemnification.”303 Thus, in UPS’s
view, the only exception recognized by Article 48 is a right of
joinder, the procedure and effects of being governed by national law.304 Therefore, UPS maintained that it was national
law, not Article 35, to which the parties must turn for any appli300 Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *1 (“The parties agree that this third-party
action is governed by the Montreal Convention, as it concerns international air
carriage of cargo.”); Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1025 n.2 (“Both parties agree that this
case is governed by the Montreal Convention.”).
301 Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *2–3.
302 Id. Some support can be mustered for this by myopically looking to the
wording of Article 48 that states, “Except as provided in Article 45, nothing in this
Chapter shall affect the rights and obligations of the carriers between themselves,
including any right of recourse or indemnification.” MC99, supra note, art. 48
(emphasis added). UPS also argued that it was supported by the fact that the
remainder of the Convention makes no distinction between the actual and contracting carrier. Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *2. The most obvious explanation
for this is the fact that MC99 was drafted by incorporating preceding instruments
of WCS. Id. at *3. Chapter V was lifted from the Guadalajara Convention, and
much of the rest of MC99 from the Warsaw Convention and its amending protocols, only the former addressed actual and contractual carriers. See id. Aside from
this, as explained by the district court, “[t]here was simply no need to distinguish
between the two types of carriers other than in Chapter V, which defines the two
types of carriers and clarifies their relationship.” Id.
303 MC99, supra note 10, art. 48.
304 Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *3.
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cable time limitations.305 The trial judge rejected this argument
and pointed out that Article 40306 (contained in Chapter V) incorporates the remainder of the Warsaw Convention and makes
its general provisions applicable to contracting/actual carriers,
including the time limit of Article 35.307
An inconsistency with UPS’s argument is that it essentially
conflicts with the basic premise that MC99 governs third-party
actions. Maintaining that premise alongside its proffered interpretation of Article 48 demands a tortured use of the word governs. This is because it essentially boils down to claiming that
MC99 governs third-party actions by providing that national law
governs third-party actions with the single exception of Article
45.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the question to be resolved
was neatly summarized by Judge O’Scannlain: “We must decide
whether the Montreal Convention’s two-year statute of limitations on ‘the right to damages’ in connection with international
air cargo shipments applies to suits seeking indemnification and
contribution.”308 The manner in which Judge O’Scannlain
pitched the issue was inspired; it drew a direct link between the
time limitation of Article 35 and the “right to damages,” explainId. at *2.
MC99, supra note 10, art. 40 (“If an actual carrier performs the whole or
part of carriage which, according to the contract referred to in Article 39, is governed by this Convention, both the contracting carrier and the actual carrier
shall, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, be subject to the rules of this
Convention, the former for the whole of the carriage contemplated in the contract, the latter solely for the carriage which it performs.”).
307 See Chubb I, 2008 WL 11357925, at *2 (“Chapter V does not, as UPS contends, establish a free-standing body of rules for third party contribution or indemnification actions, independent of the requirements of the remainder of the
Montreal Convention.”); see also id. at *3 (“The plain language of Article 45 refers
to the ‘procedure and effects’ of joinder. A statutory limitations period has nothing to do with whether or how a party is joined. Nor does it govern the ‘effects’ of
joinder. The limitations period is thus not governed by the ‘law of the court
seized of the case.’”) (footnote omitted). The court in Allianz makes the same
point. Allianz Glob. Corp. & Specialty v. EMO Trans Cal., Inc., No. C 09-4893,
2010 WL 2594360, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010) (“While the plain language of
Article 45 does require that third-party claims be subject to the procedure and
effects of the forum in which they are brought, this language does not refer to
the limitation period. The limitation period does not affect the procedures by
which a party can be joined as a third-party defendant, nor does the limitation
period govern the effects of joinder. Thus, the period set forth in Article 35 is not
affected by Article 45, and EMO’s argument is not supported by the plain language of the Montreal Convention.”) (citations omitted).
308 Chubb II, 634 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011).
305
306
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ing that “[b]y its terms, Article 35 extinguishes only a single
right: the ‘right to damages.’ ”309 This reframed the issue and
permitted the court to ask whether UPS’s claims against Qantas
fell within the single right recognized by Article 35, i.e., a right
to damages.310 Because if it did not, then the time limitation did
not apply.311
The substantive elements of the right to damages are laid out
in Articles 17 to 19 of MC99, i.e., that “by which a passenger or
consignor may hold a carrier liable for damage sustained to passengers, baggage, or cargo.”312 The right to damages referred to
in Article 35 was thus identified as the cause of action under
MC99.313 Turning to the facts, it was clear that Chubb (as subrogee of the consignee’s right) had such a right to damages
against UPS (via Menlo as the contracting carrier) or against
Qantas as the actual carrier.314 But the claim that was actually at
issue in Chubb II was something else. It was one between UPS
and Qantas, i.e., between the contracting carrier and the actual
carrier, and it was a claim for contribution/indemnification, not
damages.315 The court concluded that this claim was not based
upon the Montreal Convention’s right to damages but upon a
right of recourse; the court drew a strong distinction between
the two.316 Indeed, the court acknowledged that the Montreal
Convention does not create a cause of action for contribution/
indemnification, but neither is it preempted where available
under le droit commun.317 By making the distinction between the
right to damages and the right of recourse, the court concluded:
Id. at 1026.
Id.
311 Id. at 1026–27.
312 Id. at 1026.
313 Id. (“Construed against this backdrop, the ‘right to damages’ referenced in
Article 35 is the cause of action under the Montreal Convention by which a passenger or consignor may hold a carrier liable for damage sustained to passengers,
baggage, or cargo.”).
314 See id. at 1025.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 1026 (“UPS does not seek compensation for damage sustained to the
engine; rather, UPS, as a contracting carrier, seeks indemnification (and contribution) from Qantas, as an actual carrier, for such compensation it has already paid
Chubb.”).
317 Id. (“While the Montreal Convention does not create a cause of action for
indemnification or contribution among carriers, it does not preclude such actions as may be available under local law.”) (citing In re Air Crash at Lexington,
Ky., August 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316, 2007 WL 2915187, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5,
2007); Sompo Japan Ins. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776, 785–87 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
309
310
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“[B]ecause an action between carriers for indemnification or
contribution is premised on the ‘right of recourse,’ rather than
the ‘right to damages,’ Article 35’s time bar does not apply. Instead, the timing of such an action is governed by local law.”318
In the court’s view, if the time limit of Article 35 were to have
been regarded as applicable to the right of recourse under Article 37, then the effect of such in the present case would be to
extinguish UPS’s third-party action.319 The court regarded this
as inimical to the Montreal Convention’s regime because it
would produce a conflict between two of its articles.320 How so?
The purpose of Article 37 is to ensure that nothing in the Montreal Convention shall prejudice the question of whether a person liable under the Montreal Convention has a right of
recourse against any other person.321 But, if Article 35 were to
be applied to such a right of recourse, then the very mischief
that Article 37 sought to avoid would arise.322 To avoid this conflict, Judge O’Scannlain determined that the right of damages
referred to in Article 35 must be interpreted as not including
the right of recourse against another carrier.323
Other provisions of MC99 supported the distinction between
the right to damages and the right of recourse.324 For instance,
Judge O’Scannlain referred to Article 35, noting that it only envisages the extinguishment of the right to damages where an
action is not brought within the two-year period.325 In his view,
had the drafters intended for the time limit to apply to thirdparty actions arising out of the same damage, then it would have
Id. at 1027.
Id.
320 Id.
321 MC99, supra note 10, art. 37.
322 Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1027.
323 Id. (“To avoid an explicit conflict between Articles 35 and 37, the ‘right to
damages’ extinguished by Article 35 must be understood not to include a carrier’s
‘right of recourse’ against another carrier.”).
324 Id. Judge O’Scannlain referred inter alia to Article 48 but did not expand on
it. See id. However, we can speculate on his possible reasoning. Article 48 (entitled
“Mutual Relations of Contracting and Actual Carriers”) makes express provision
for the application of Article 45, on an exceptional basis, to recourse actions
between such carriers. MC99, supra note 10, art. 48. The court thus likely concluded that Article 45 represented the single exception and that no other provision of the Montreal Convention, such as Article 35, was intended to apply to
such actions, rather such actions would be governed by national law. See Chubb II,
634 F.3d at 1028.
325 Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1027.
318
319
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referred to all actions.326 Article 45 also lent support. The court
stated:
Thus, where an action is brought against one carrier within Article 35’s two-year period, “that carrier shall have the right to require” other carriers “to be joined in the proceedings,” and that
third-party action will be subject to “the procedures and effects”
of local law, not the strictures of Article 35.327

This statement is welcome but only insofar as it holds that Article 45 provides that le droit commun governs the procedures and
effects of joinder. However, the Author submits that the manner
of the court’s expression may be exploited to interpret this reference to “local law” more broadly. The court’s formulation
could be taken to suggest that Article 45’s reference to “procedures and effects” of local law is intended to apply local law to
the third-party action in its entirety. This interpretation should
be avoided for three reasons. First, it presumes that joinder
amounts to a third-party action, and hence, a right of recourse is
guaranteed. This is not the thrust of Article 45; Article 45 only
guarantees joinder but leaves the effects of such joinder to le
droit commun.328 In other words, the question of whether a right
of recourse exists at all is not decided by the Montreal Convention but by le droit commun. Second, it gives the impression that le
droit commun governs third-party actions by leave of Article 45,
which is not the case. Article 45’s primary concern is with the
main action by the passenger/shipper against the carrier chosen
as a single defendant and ensuring that the defendant carrier
can join the other in the same proceedings.329 As far as recourse
actions between the carriers are concerned, Article 45’s secondary purpose is only to facilitate such actions; it does not purport to regulate any action between the two carriers.330 Third, it
simply does not agree with the text of Article 45 that limits the
326 Id. (“[I]t is worth noting that Article 35 only mandates that ‘the right to
damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within a period of two
years. . . . It does not require that ‘all actions’ relating to a particular event must
be brought within two years. Thus, if a party has timely brought an action for
damages against an actual carrier or a contracting carrier, nothing in Article 35
prevents the defendant carrier from exercising its Article 45 right to ‘require the
other carrier to be joined in the proceedings,’ subject to the ‘procedure and
effects’ of local law.”) (citation omitted).
327 Id.
328 MC99, supra note 10, art. 45.
329 See id.
330 See supra introduction to Part III.
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application of le droit commun to the procedures and effects pertaining to joinder of the other carrier and not beyond.331
All of the above led Judge O’Scannlain to conclude that “the
plain language of the Montreal Convention makes clear that actions for indemnification and contribution are not subject to Article 35’s two-year statute of limitations.”332 The judgment of the
Ninth Circuit is to be commended for breaking with the U.S.
courts’ long-running approach to the issue. It has been received
favorably by some district courts.333 However, it is to be criticized
for refusing to consider the travaux préparatoires because this may
leave room for the issue to be relitigated at some point.334 Likewise, the precedents on WCS, i.e., the progeny of Reed II, that
had determined that the regime did apply to third-party actions,
although noted as “unpersuasive” by the court, were not expressly rejected.335 More unfortunate is that the ratio decidendi
limited itself to stating that Article 35 of MC99 did not apply to
third-party actions and stopped short of holding that MC99 does
not generally apply to third-party actions.336 One suspects this is
331 For example, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint
on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.
But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court’s leave if it files the
third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 14(a)(1). This rule does not address the substantive elements of the thirdparty cause of action.
332 Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1028.
333 See, e.g., AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Geodis Calberson Hungaria Logisztikai
KFT, No. 16-CV-9710, 2017 WL 5891818, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2017); Tokio
Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co. v. Danzas Corp., No. 17 C 7228, 2018 WL
2214093, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2018) (both courts giving a lengthy account of
Chubb II and following its reasoning on the non-application of Article 35 of MC99
to third-party actions).
334 The court thought itself unable to consult the travaux because the text was
unambiguous. See Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1028 (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989)). According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, recourse to the supplementary means of interpretation (including travaux préparatoires) is permissible for confirming the meaning
arrived at by the general rule of interpretation under Article 31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
335 See Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1028 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. MSAS Cargo Int’l,
Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Data Gen. Corp. v. Air Express
Int’l Co., 676 F. Supp. 538, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Split End Ltd. v. Dimerco
Express (Phils) Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1506, 1986 WL 2199, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
1986); L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp., 488 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549–50 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985)). All the court was prepared to say was: “We have considered these
cases, but find their textual analysis unpersuasive.” Id.
336 Id. at 1027.
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only because the parties had submitted the dispute to the court
on the basic premise that MC99 governed the recourse action
between them. Indeed, that the court was minded toward the
more general proposition is suggested by its positive endorsement of Connaught.337
The greatest value of Chubb II is its clear distinction between
the cause of action pertaining to the right to damages recognized by MC99 and the cause of action involved in third-party
actions for contribution/indemnification.338 As discussed above
in the context of In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, a new line of
argument was raised to the effect that the third-party action
brought by the manufacturer defendants is coextensive with the
underlying passenger action and ought, therefore, to be governed by the same law, i.e., the Warsaw Convention.339 While the
In re Air Crash Near Nantucket court had rejected this proposition
and maintained that the two actions were distinct, its holding
provided no reasoning and instead relied on authority that we
saw was not directly on point.340 This line of argumentation—
which was also featured in the Armavia case discussed in Part I—
was taken up by the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in
Chubb II, this time in the context of MC99.341 Although it did not
expressly state as much, the court implicitly rejected the notion
that a third-party action for contribution/indemnification is coextensive with, or derivative of, the cause of action upon which
the right to damages is established; this time providing a fuller
reasoning for the distinction.342
In this context, it is worth noting a 2012 decision of the Court
of Appeal for New South Wales, Australia, in United Airlines Inc v
Sercel Australia Pty Ltd.343 Again, the issue was the applicability of
337 Id. at 1028 (“[W]e are guided by the Ontario Supreme Court of Canada’s
ruling that Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention does not apply to suits brought
by one carrier against another. . . . ‘Such claims,’ the court held, were not ‘intended to be included, within the purview of The Warsaw Convention,’ which,
‘deals with the claims of passengers, consignors and consignees, and the liability
of carriers therefor,’ not ‘with the claims of carriers inter se.’”) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
338 Id. at 1026.
339 See supra Section II.B.3.b.
340 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island on October 31, 1999, 340 F. Supp. 2d
240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atl. S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124, 130 (1956); Triguero v. Consol. Rail Corp., 932 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir.
1991)).
341 Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1027.
342 See id. at 1026.
343 [2012] NSWCA 24 (Austl.).
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the time limitation—this time of WCS344—to a third-party action
for indemnification taken against an air carrier.345 Like Chubb II,
the Australian court distinguished between the causes of action,
explaining that the cause of action granted to the passenger
arises under the Warsaw Convention346 and consists of a claim
made by a passenger against a carrier seeking to hold it liable to
compensate the plaintiff for damages arising from personal injury.347 In contrast, the court explained that a third-party action
is not one for damages for the injury of a passenger but one that
seeks to hold the carrier liable to provide contribution or indemnification, the cause of action for which is sourced, not in
the Warsaw Convention, but in le droit commun.348 On that basis,
344 MC99 did not apply because the accident involved had occurred in 2005,
whereas Australia only ratified MC99 in 2008. Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act
1959 (Cth) n 3 (Austl.). The action was taken pursuant to the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) pt II s 11, which gives force of law to the Warsaw
Convention (as amended by the Hague Protocol and MAP4).
345 This was a case relating to injuries suffered by a passenger while traveling
on business with United Airlines Inc. from Sydney to Houston. Sercel [2012]
NSWCA 24 at [1]. The passenger was seriously injured when part of the interior
of the aircraft detached during the landing run and fell on him. Id. Although an
action existed under WCS, the passenger made no claim against United. Id. at
[3]. However, the passenger was compensated by the passenger’s employer,
Sercel Australia Pty. Ltd. (Sercel), pursuant to Australian workers’ compensation
legislation. Id. at [2]. Sercel then sought indemnification for a sum under
$100,000 (AUD) from United Airlines Inc. based on a right of action granted
under the same legislation. Id. at [2]–[3]. The relevant part of the legislation
provided, “If the injury for which compensation is payable under this Act was
caused under circumstances creating a liability in some person other than the
worker’s employer to pay damages in respect of the injury, the following provisions have effect . . . if the worker has recovered compensation under this Act,
the person by whom the compensation was paid is entitled to be indemnified by
the person so liable to pay those damages (being an indemnity limited to the
amount of those damages) . . . .” Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) pt 5 div 5 s
151Z(1)(d) (Austl.).
346 This was given effect by the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth)
pt II s 11 (Austl.). The Act provides: “Subject to the next succeeding section, the
liability of a carrier under this Part in respect of personal injury suffered by a
passenger, not being injury that has resulted in the death of the passenger, is in
substitution for any civil liability of the carrier under any other law in respect of
the injury.” Id. pt IV s 36. Section 36 only encompasses the cause of action of a
passenger suffering personal injury. Id. Section 35 addresses liability in respect of
death. Id. pt IV s 35.
347 See Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24 at [9].
348 Id. at [67] (“Section 37 [of the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959
(Cth) (Austl.)] does not deal with an action for damages or liability for the injury
or death of the passenger, though it does provide for liability of the carrier in
respect of the injury to or death of the passenger. It deals with the liability to pay
two types of payments (creating two co-relative rights of well-known rights or enti-
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the court held that the Warsaw Convention’s time-bar did not
apply to the cause of action for contribution/indemnification.349 In the court’s view, “[c]laims by persons other than passengers their estates or heirs were not picked up by the words of
the Convention.”350 Simply put, the Warsaw Convention does
not apply to third-party actions for contribution or
indemnification.351
While the Author finds the source of the cause of action a less
persuasive argument,352 Sercel’s distinction between the nature of
tlements) which might arise in respect of the death of or injury to a passenger workers’ compensation payments and contribution of another tortfeasor who is
also liable. Neither type of liability or right is for damages or for the primary
liability, though as would have been understood in 1959, both are, or are likely to
be, conditioned on the existence of liability of the carrier to the passenger for
injury or death.”).
349 Id. at [77] (“Thus, in my view, the text and structure of the Act, the Warsaw
Convention, the Warsaw/Hague Convention and the Convention lead to the conclusion that the right of indemnity in ss 14 and 37 is not subject to the two year
time bar in s 34 and Art 29.”). The right of recourse was referenced in Section 37
of the Carriers’ Liability Act. Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) pt IV
s 37 (Austl.). Regarding the time-bar for actions under Section 34 of the Australian Act (incorporating Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention), it has a different
referent to that of Section 37. The Section 34 time-bar refers only to the right to
damages, i.e., the cause of action granted by the Warsaw Convention under Section 36. Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24 at [66]. Whereas Section 37 refers to the right to
indemnification or contribution, such right not being granted by the Warsaw
Convention, and Section 36 only mentions it in order to safeguard against its
exclusion and permit national law to grant such rights. See id. at [69]. The court
stated:
Section 37 operated in its terms to protect the rights there identified. It was not
a ‘right to damages’ as in s 34. . . . Sections 34 and 37 were directed to different
legal rights, obligations and remedies: the ‘right to damages’ (s 34) and the liability to indemnify and pay contribution (s 37).
Id.
350 Id. at [99].
351 That this was the view of the Warsaw Convention by the drafters of the Civil
Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 was confirmed by the monetary limitation
imposed on claims by Section 37. Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth)
pt IV s 37 (Austl.). It ensured that the liability of the carrier in such a claim would
not exceed the monetary limits of the Warsaw Convention. See id. Justice Allsop
(then President of the Court of Appeal) shrewdly observed that such provision
would have been unnecessary had the drafters assumed that such actions were
already covered by the Warsaw Convention. See Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24 at [75].
352 Such an argument depends upon accepting the view that the Warsaw Convention provides an independent and exclusive cause of action for passenger injury and death and wrongful death. The court did appear to hold this. See id. at
[47] (“It is important to appreciate that it is Art 17 that creates the relevant cause
of action: for wrongful death or personal injury . . . .”) (citing Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Mex. City Aircrash
of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 410–14 (9th Cir. 1983)) (“It is important to
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an action for damages and that of a third-party action for contribution or indemnification reinforces the same distinction made
in Chubb II.353 In addition, by endorsing the general non-applicability of WCS to third-party actions, the Sercel court went further
than the Ninth Circuit was prepared (or perhaps permitted) to
do in Chubb II. Unfortunately, having been decided under WCS,
the lucid and compelling rationale of Sercel on this point of law
may not be immune from challenge in the context of MC99.
B.

A POSSIBLE ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE

The U.K. courts have yet to issue an opinion on the issue,
possibly because it is generally accepted that WCS and MC99 are
not applicable to recourse actions.354 However, in 2015, the
Court of Appeal, in the case of Feest v. South West Strategic Health
Authority,355 did deliver a judgment on a third-party action for
contribution in the context of the Athens Convention.356 Although obviously not a WCS or MC99 case, nor even a carriageby-air case, Lord Justice Tomlinson’s opinion should be recognized as holding persuasive value because the Athens Convention was modeled on the Warsaw Convention and the provisions
at issue are substantially the same in both instruments.357 The
appreciate that it is Art 17 that creates the relevant cause of action: for wrongful
death or personal injury.”); see also id. at [48] (“[T]ogether, Arts 17 and 24 can be
seen to create and condition a cause of action in favo[ ]r of the passenger and his
or her estate or heirs, subject to the operation of national law in the identification of such people. The phrase ‘however founded’ does not widen the cause of
action created by Art 17 (when read with Art 24) into one that is available beyond
the liability contemplated by Art 17 - the liability for damage sustained arising out
of the performance of the contract of transportation which in the event of injury
is sustained by the passenger and in the case of death, may be sustained by his or
her estate or others. It is a structure not apt to encompass other legal claims by
third parties who are strangers to the passenger or the contract of carriage.”).
The author argues that the Warsaw Convention and MC99 are capable of providing an independent cause of action for passenger injury or death but that it is not
exclusive. CLUXTON, supra note 47, at 150. However, the author also argues that
the Warsaw Convention and MC99 are not capable of providing an independent
cause of action for wrongful death. Id.
353 See Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24 at [69]; Chubb II, 634 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir.
2011).
354 See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 274, at VII-232.
355 [2015] EWCA (Civ) 708, [2016] QB 503 (Eng.).
356 Athens Convention, supra note 52, at 24.
357 For our purposes, Articles 14 and 16 of the Athens Convention are of relevance. Article 14 provides the basis of claims and states that “[n]o action for
damages for the death of or personal injury to a passenger, or for the loss of or
damage to luggage, shall be brought against a carrier or performing carrier otherwise than in accordance with this Convention.” Id. This is the equivalent of
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Athens Convention, in the simplest of terms, does for carriage
of passengers by sea what WCS and MC99 do for carriage of
passengers by air.358
The case involved a claimant who had sustained a spinal injury while on a boat trip in the Bristol Channel.359 She brought a
claim in negligence against the defendant (her employer), alleging that the injury had been sustained in the course of her employment.360 The defendant denied liability and brought a thirdparty action for contribution against the sea carrier (Bay Island
Voyages) who operated the boat trip.361 The carrier argued that
the Athens Convention provided the exclusive basis for claims
against carriers and that the defendant’s contribution claim was
time-barred by the Convention’s two-year limitation.362 Lord Justice Tomlinson of the Court of Appeal had to decide whether
the Athens Convention governs a third-party action for contribution made against a carrier.363
The lower appellate court had applied the Warsaw Convention to the third-party action, taking the view that a third-party
action for contribution and a passenger action for damages was
essentially the same creature.364 Lord Justice Tomlinson rejected
this notion, holding instead that there existed a distinction such
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention. Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 24.
Article 16 of the Athens Convention provides, inter alia, a two-year time-bar for
bringing of actions. See Athens Convention, supra note 52, art. 16.
358 See Athens Convention, supra note 52, at 21–22; Warsaw Convention, supra
note 9, at 3014–15; MC99, supra note 10, at 350–51.
359 Feest [2015] EWCA (Civ) 708 [6].
360 Id. at [7].
361 Id. The third-party action was brought pursuant to the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, c. 47, § 1 (UK).
362 The carrier essentially argued that the Athens Convention provided the exclusive cause of action for claims made against carriers in relation to injuries
suffered by passengers coming within its scope of application. Feest [2015] EWCA
(Civ) 708 [9] . If the third-party claimant wanted to seek contribution from the
carrier then it was obliged to rely upon the Athens Convention, which meant that
the basis upon which the third-party claimant relied (i.e., the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978) was preempted. Id. at [9]–[11]. Once it was shown that the
claimant would have no alternative but to bring an action under the Athens Convention, the next line of defense was to show that such a claim was time-barred.
See id. at [9]–[10].
363 See id. at [1] (“The first question is whether the Convention, which undoubtedly governs the liability owed by carriers to their passengers, extends also
to claims against the carrier for contribution to the liability of others.”).
364 Id. at [14]. Referring to the opinion of the trial judge, Lord Justice Tomlinson said, “He considered it a ‘solecism’ to say that a claim for damages and a
claim for contribution to a claim for damages are different creatures.” Id.
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that a claim for contribution could not be regarded as an action
for damages for personal injury to a passenger.365 This holding
was supported by noting that the Athens Convention only aims
to unify certain rules and not provide “a complete code governing all liability of sea carriers to whomsoever owed.”366 Lord
Justice Tomlinson summed up his view in remarkably concise
terms: “[R]eading the Convention as a whole it is to my mind
clear that it deals with claims by passengers against carriers, and
with nothing else.”367
In addition to distinguishing based on the identity of the parties, the court also found support in the distinct sources of each
cause of action. While recognizing that “the liability of the carrier to contribute is critically dependent upon its own liability to
the passenger,”368 the court emphasized that the cause of action
for contribution is provided under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (U.K.), thus being an autonomous cause of action distinct in source from the Warsaw Convention’s action for
damages.369 In so doing, Lord Justice Tomlinson showed he was
more in favor of the view that the Warsaw Convention and
MC99 likewise do not apply to claims for contribution;370 he
cited SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, AIR LAW, which referenced
Connaught, Chubb II, and Sercel.371 Although, he acknowledged
365 Id. at [15] (“Moreover I respectfully disagree with the judge as to the
proper characterisation of the claim to contribution. An action in which a claim
to contribution from the carrier is sought in respect of the liability of SWSHA for
the personal injury to Dr Feest is not in my view ‘an action for damages for . . .
personal injury to a passenger . . . brought against a carrier.’”) (alteration in
original).
366 Id.
367 Id. Additional support for this view is found in the fact that the Athens
Convention makes only one reference to recourse (i.e., in Article 4(5)), which is
in the context of recourse claims between actual and contracting carriers. Athens
Convention, supra note 52, art. 4(5). No reference whatsoever was made to recourse actions involving other parties. See Feest [2015] EWCA (Civ) 708 [16].
(“Nowhere else in the Convention are rights of recourse as between the carrier
and the performing carrier dealt with. This is unsurprising, as such matters will
be governed by the terms of the contractual arrangements concluded between
carrier and performing carrier. Furthermore, rights of recourse as between carriers and other parties are simply not mentioned.”).
368 Id. at [21].
369 Id. (Lord Justice Tomlinson opining that “[i]t is unsurprising that the claim
in itself is unaffected by the provisions of the Athens Convention.”).
370 Id. at [18] (citing Connaught Labs. Ltd. v. Air Can. (1978), 94 D.L.R. 3d
586, 593 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)).
371 Id. at [20] (citing Chubb II, 634 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011); United Airlines Inc v Sercel Austl Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 24 at [119] (Austl.)).
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the existence of controversy over the matter and cited several
U.S. cases in which the courts had applied the Warsaw Convention.372 Nevertheless, were a suitable case under MC99 to present itself, the U.K. courts would most likely take a lead from
Feest and hold that MC99 does not apply to third-party actions
for contribution/indemnification.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the title of this Article makes abundantly clear, the Author
is no fan of the Second Circuit’s decision in Reed II. He hopes
that the analysis presented in this Article and the conclusions
reached therefrom will provide sufficient proof that the time
has come to dump Reed II, and by so doing, we can get real
about third-party actions in the context of WCS and, more pressingly, MC99.
This Article began with the Armavia case because, aside from
giving some factual context and illustration, it highlights two key
aspects of the issue. First, the diversity of opinion that currently
exists between courts, both domestically and internationally, on
the question of the applicability of the WCS (and MC99) to
third-party actions, which has led to a lack of uniformity that
may be prejudicial to the purposes of those systems. Second, in
holding to the non-applicability of the WCS (and MC99) to
third-party actions, the risk of circumventing the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention arises, which may likewise be prejudicial. The driving goal of this Article is to identify and evaluate
the doctrinal foundations for the competing arguments for and
against the applicability of the WCS and MC99 to third-party actions, and in so doing, attempt to divine which is doctrinally
correct.
Part II of this Article began by examining the so-called préposé
problem, i.e., that by simply suing a carrier’s préposé, a plaintiffpassenger could, knowing that the carrier would have to indemnify its préposé, circumvent the Warsaw Convention’s limitation
of liability.373 This was viewed as inimical to the Warsaw Convention’s goals. The international community’s response at large
had been to close this loophole by amending the Warsaw Con372 Id. at [18] (citing Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 611 F. Supp.
436, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Oriental Fire & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of
Decatur, 581 N.E.2d 49, 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Royal Ins. Co. v. Emery Air
Freight Corp., 834 F. Supp. 633, 634–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
373 See supra Section II.A.
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vention with the Hague Protocol.374 However, with the United
States being utterly opposed to acceding to the Hague Protocol,
its courts found themselves in a tight spot. Rather than concede
that the Warsaw Convention could be circumvented in this way,
the Second Circuit decided that the Warsaw Convention must
be applied to an action taken against the préposé of a carrier.375
Its reasoning was based on a suspect definition of the term carrier as including its préposés and an unjustifiably broad interpretation of Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention;376 it was
demonstrated in Section II.A.2 that the Second Circuit’s rationes
do not pass muster. At base, although arguably a necessary evil,
Reed II is an amendment of the Warsaw Convention by judicial
fiat and, therefore, amounts to a usurpation of the legislative
function.
Furthermore, Reed II committed two errors that proved baneful for the subsequent issue of the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention to third-party actions for contribution/indemnification. First, although it only extended the application of the Warsaw Convention’s monetary limitation of liability to actions
against préposés,377 it was inevitable that its reasoning would be
employed by the courts to extend the application of other provisions of the Warsaw Convention (e.g., time limitations), something that the Hague Protocol had not done. Second, it fostered
the notion that the identity of the plaintiff is not an essential
factor in determining the application of the Warsaw Convention. Its interpretation of Article 24 was that the Warsaw Convention would apply if the action were taken against a carrier for
damages arising from an event covered by the Warsaw Convention during qualifying carriage by air.378
In Section II.B, this Article turned directly to the question of
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions. Ironically, Reed II had not directly involved a third-party
action for contribution or indemnification, but the court’s decision was driven by the reality that the carrier would be forced to
indemnify its préposé; the court’s eye had been firmly fixed on
this in reaching its decision.379 Two approaches were identified.
First, the orthodox approach stands for the view that the Warsaw
374
375
376
377
378
379

See supra Section II.A.
Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
See id. at 1083, 1092.
Id.
See id. at 1084.
See supra Section II.B.

82

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

Convention does not apply to third-party actions for contribution or indemnification.380 Indeed, it was noted that the Warsaw
Convention makes no reference at all to recourse actions, an
understandable omission given the state of the law at the time of
its drafting. With the subsequent evolution of the law, the existence of recourse actions was noted within the international air
law community.381 At the Guadalajara Conference in 1961 and
the Guatemala City Conference in 1971, both held under the
auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
topic of recourse actions was raised.382 Rather than take steps to
regulate such actions, the international community limited itself
to merely facilitating such actions where they existed under le
droit commun,383 thereby underlining the reality that the Warsaw
Convention does not govern nor apply to recourse actions.
That the Warsaw Convention does not apply to recourse actions was a reality reflected in the approach taken by a Canadian
court in Connaught.384 Therein, the court emphasized the importance of the identities of the parties to the application of the
Warsaw Convention and held that the Warsaw Convention only
governs actions taken by passengers (or shippers) against carriers, not those of third parties against the carrier.385 This corresponds with the underlying cause of action upon which Warsaw
Convention claims are based, i.e., the contractual undertaking
between passenger (or shipper) and carrier.386
The baneful influence of Reed II was revealed in the U.S.
courts’ alternative approach to the question of the applicability
of the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions for contribution/indemnification. The meaning attributed to the term “carrier” in Reed II permitted the courts to view actions taken against
préposés as actions against the carrier.387 In addition, the expansive interpretation of Article 24 adopted by Reed II meant the
courts could dispense with the requirement that the plaintiff
must be a passenger or shipper.388 Reed II supplied the courts
with the necessary ammunition to make the Warsaw Convention
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.1.
382 See supra Section II.B.1.
383 See Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1083.
384 See supra Section II.B.1; Connaught, 94 D.L.R. 3d at 593–94.
385 Connaught, 94 D.L.R. 3d at 593–94.
386 For more on the nature of the cause of action in the Warsaw Convention
and MC99, see generally CLUXTON, supra note 47.
387 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1083.
388 See id. at 1092.
380
381
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applicable to third-party actions for contribution/indemnification. This resulted in a slew of cases—L.B. Smith, Split End, and
Data General—referred to herein as the progeny of Reed II.389
The exception (Mitchell) proved the rule that these cases had all
applied the Warsaw Convention to third-party actions out of fear
that not doing so would conflict with Reed II and create a risk of
circumvention of the Warsaw Convention’s monetary limit of
liability.390
Lastly, Section II.B.3 studied two outlier cases, i.e., In re Air
Crash at Agana and In re Air Crash Near Nantucket.391 In these,
U.S. courts refused to apply the Warsaw Convention to thirdparty actions against carriers.392 In so doing, they echoed the
reasoning of the orthodox approach, emphasizing the identities
of the parties to actions as a key factor in establishing the applicability of the Warsaw Convention.393 Yet, In re Air Crash at Agana
and In re Air Crash Near Nantucket conflict with the alternative
approach generally adopted by the U.S. courts.394 While it is submitted that they were correctly decided, the difficulty with these
decisions is their failure to adequately address the conflict with,
or distinguish themselves from, Reed II and its progeny.
Part III began with a summary of the relevant provisions of
WCS as consolidated in MC99 and demonstrated how the U.S.
courts initially maintained the status quo, i.e., with Chubb I and
other decisions, thereby continuing with MC99 the alternative
approach to third-party actions taken toward WCS.395 However,
in Chubb II, the Ninth Circuit upset the applecart and concluded
389 L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp., 488 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1985); Split End Ltd. v. Dimerco Express (Phils) Inc., No. 85 Civ. 1506, 1986
WL 2199, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1986); Data Gen. Corp. v. Air Express Int’l Co.,
676 F. Supp. 538, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
390 See supra Section II.B.2.a.
391 In re Air Crash at Agana on August 6, 1997, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1999); In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island on October 31,
1999, 340 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). For details regarding In re Air
Crash at Agana, see Sundvall & Andolina, supra note 205, at 175–76.
392 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 244; In re Air Crash at
Agana, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237; Sundvall & Andolina, supra note 205, at
175–76.
393 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 244; In re Air Crash at
Agana, Civ. No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237; Sundvall & Andolina, supra note 205, at
175–76.
394 Compare In re Air Crash Near Nantucket, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 244, and Sundvall
& Andolina, supra note 205, at 175–76 (summarizing In re Air Crash at Agana, Civ.
No. 97-7023, MDL No. 1237), with L.B. Smith, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 550, and Split End,
1986 WL 2199, at *6, and Data Gen. Corp., 676 F. Supp. at 541.
395 See supra introduction to Part III.
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that MC99 does not apply to third-party actions, thereby aligning with the orthodox position.396 Although credit should also
be given to Judge Block in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket,397 Judge
O’Scannlain in Chubb II added a powerful additional argument
in support of the orthodox approach, one that made a distinction in nature between an action for damages and a recourse
action, concluding that the Warsaw Convention only applies to
the former.398 This reasoning was also key to the Australian
court’s decision not to apply WCS to a third-party action in
Sercel.399 In addition, although not a carriage-by-air case, this Article found support for this reasoning in the English Court of
Appeal decision in Feest.400 Thus, in light of Chubb II and these
other authorities, this Article refers to an orthodox approach+
(plus).
This may seem like a formalistic perspective to adopt since the
liability of the carrier to provide contribution or indemnification is conditional on its primary liability toward the passenger.
However, if one looks at the matter from the perspective of the
right being vindicated by each cause of action, it becomes clear
that they do indeed represent independent and separate causes
of action. A right to damages seeks to compensate for damages
arising from injury suffered during international carriage by
air.401 A right to contribution or indemnification seeks to reimburse a paying tortfeasor or indemnifier who has paid more
than its equitable share;402 the purpose is not to compensate the
passenger for their loss but to redistribute the liability between
the liable parties. That a third-party action for contribution or
indemnification is so derivative of the main action as to be indistinguishable for the purposes of determining the applicability of
the Warsaw Convention—an argument raised in In re Air Crash
Near Nantucket and Armavia—is thus not sustainable.
The tide has changed, and there is growing authority for the
view that third-party actions are not governed by WCS or
See supra Section III.A; Chubb II, 634 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011).
See supra Section II.B.3.b.
398 See supra Section III.A.
399 See supra Section III.A; United Airlines Inc v Sercel Austl Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA
24 at [90] (Austl.).
400 See supra Section III.B; Feest v. S. W. Strategic Health Auth. [2015] EWCA
(Civ) 708 [15], [2016] QB 503 (Eng.).
401 Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1026.
402 Id. at 1026–27.
396
397
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MC99.403 This is the correct view. Therefore, the decisions
reached by the Cour de Cassation in Armavia, by the Ninth Circuit
in Chubb II, and by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in
Sercel, got it right. It seems Judge Frankel’s opinion in Reed I is
finally vindicated.
Love it or loathe it, Reed II served a purpose during the period
in which the United States was neither party to the Hague Protocol nor the Guadalajara Convention by ensuring that the Warsaw Convention could not be circumvented by means of a
plaintiff suing a préposé free of the Warsaw Convention. However, now that the Hague Protocol is applicable in the United
States, via U.S. accession to MAP4, and given that MC99 (to
which the United States and 136 other States are Contracting
Parties)404 governs most of the international carriage by air, the
need for Reed II has greatly diminished. It is time to dump Reed
II once and for all and accept that the orthodox approach was
the correct one all along. As we saw in Part III, Reed II continues
to exert its noxious influence on the matter of third-party actions in the context of MC99. Given the limited holding in
Chubb II,405 until such a time as there is U.S. judicial endorsement across the circuit courts of the general non-applicability of
WCS and MC99 to third-party actions, there will still exist the
potential for conflict between U.S. courts on this matter and,
most likely, between some U.S. courts and those of other countries, such as France, Australia, and the U.K. Is Reed II not now
more of a hindrance to uniformity than a safeguard?
What barriers remain to banishing Reed II and fully endorsing
the non-applicability of WCS and MC99 to third-party actions?
The Author believes there are two principal concerns. First,
there is a glaring issue with one of the pillars of the orthodox
approach, as applied in Connaught.406 Second, there is a risk of
exposing carriers to the risk of circumvention of the Warsaw
Convention. The following discussion of these issues raises pol403 See id. at 1028; United Airlines Inc v Sercel Austl Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 24 at
[113] (Austl.).
404 MC99 entered into force on November 4, 2003, and currently has 137 contracting parties. Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Current Lists of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties, https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/lists/current lists of
parties/allitems.aspx [https://perma.cc/95SU-GNAB] (search “9740” in the
“Find an item” field; then select “English” under “Status (EN)”).
405 See Chubb II, 634 F.3d at 1028.
406 See Connaught Labs. Ltd. v. Air Can. (1978), 94 D.L.R. 3d 586, 593–94
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (limiting the application of the WSC to “passengers, consignors and consignees”).
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icy considerations outside the scope of this Article, which has
focused on the strict doctrinal issues at play. Nevertheless, the
Author thinks it is germane and important to flag some of these
policy considerations.407
The glaring issue with the orthodox approach relates to the
supposition that the Warsaw Convention only applies to actions
against the carrier taken by passengers or shippers. What about
wrongful death actions? These are actions against the carrier,
but they are not taken by the passenger; they are taken by third
parties (i.e., to the contractual undertaking between passenger
and carrier), typically spouses, children, and/or close relatives
of the passenger. The logic of the orthodox approach would
lead to the conclusion that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to wrongful death actions, but when we look at the text of
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention, we see that it states:
(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to
the conditions and limits set out in this Convention.
(2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring
suit and what are their respective rights.408

One of the purposes of Article 24 is to ensure that the Warsaw
Convention would apply to wrongful death actions.409 The substance of Article 24(2), read in light of Article 24(1), is not only
to ensure that the Warsaw Convention will apply, but to ensure
that it is not prejudicial to the question of who has the right to
sue in wrongful death cases. The identity of the plaintiff in
wrongful death was a question that the drafters had very deliberately left to be determined by le droit commun. This evidences
that, contrary to the orthodox approach’s point of view, the
Warsaw Convention does indeed apply to at least one type of
action by a third party against the carrier, i.e., the Warsaw Convention is not only applicable to actions by passengers or shippers against the carrier. While it is abundantly clear that the
drafters had wrongful death actions in mind when drafting
these provisions,410 it is possible to interpret them as casting a
For a fuller discussion of some of the policy considerations, see generally
CLUXTON, supra note 47.
408 Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 24.
409 For an account of the drafting history and purposes of Article 24, see
CLUXTON, supra note 47, at 38–54.
410 See id. at 54.
407
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much wider net, one that would capture all non-contractual actions by third parties pertaining to damages arising from the
death or personal injury to a passenger; furthermore, under
MC99, these provisions have also been adopted for cargo and
delay actions.411 Whether such a broad interpretation is correct,
or even desirable, is a question that can be left for another
day.412 What is of immediate relevance is what impact, if any, this
has on third-party actions.
If one adopts the broad interpretation of Article 24 of the
Warsaw Convention and Article 29 of MC99, then a third-party
action for contribution or indemnification could fall within that
interpretation and, therefore, be subject to the Warsaw Convention’s provisions. For the reasons explained throughout, the Author’s view that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention did not
intend such a broad interpretation and that they did not conceive the Warsaw Convention applying to recourse actions at all.
But it must be admitted that the ambiguity surrounding this
question is a thorn in the side of the orthodox approach. However, this argument is rendered moot by the distinction applied
by the courts in Chubb II, Sercel, and Feest, between an action for
damages and a third-party action for contribution or indemnification.413 The weakness with the original orthodox approach
has been remedied with the orthodox approach+ (plus).
411 Article 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention addressed actions for damages arising from accidental passenger death or personal injury during qualifying international carriage by air (Article 17); it did not apply to cargo (Article 18) or delay
(Article 19), which were addressed by Article 24(1). Warsaw Convention, supra
note 9, art. 24(2). First, under the Guatemala City Protocol (GCP) and then
Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 (MAP4), the text of Article 24 was amended,
such that the wording “without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights” was also
applicable to cargo and delay actions. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 46,
art. IX; MAP4, supra note 46, art. VIII. Under Article 29, the same wording is
applied to passenger, baggage, and cargo actions. MC99, supra note 10, art. 29.
412 It is difficult to reconcile the contractual emphasis of the Warsaw Convention (and MC99) with a construction of Article 24 that would permit a wide range
of potential plaintiffs. See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 274, at VII-401.
The drafters of the Warsaw Convention certainly contemplated its application
being limited to a narrow class of potential plaintiffs. Yet they clearly intended it
to apply to some third parties to the contract (e.g., wrongful death plaintiffs).
How far they intended this to extend and whether the text of the Warsaw Convention succeeded in attaining that intention are questions ripe for future research. On the question of who has the right to sue in cargo cases, see the
authorities and literature cited by Shawcross and Beaumont. Id. at VII-530–31.
413 See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
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The second issue with adopting the orthodox approach (including the plus version) is that it opens the door to circumvention of the Warsaw Convention. If the Warsaw Convention does
not apply to third-party actions, the risk emerges that the plaintiff might sue a third party, free of the Warsaw Convention and
that the third party will seek recourse from the carrier. If the
Warsaw Convention does not apply to the third-party action,
then the carrier may end up being indirectly subjected to liability unconditioned by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
In reality, the risk of circumvention is far less than it seems;
several factors must be borne in mind when assessing the gravity
of the risk of circumvention. First, with the Hague Protocol,
Guadalajara Convention, MAP4, and now MC99, the liability of
the préposé is governed by the Warsaw Convention; this fact, in
and of itself, greatly limits the scope for potential circumvention. Second, doctrines of contribution or indemnification generally permit a third-party defendant, e.g., the carrier, to invoke
the same conditions and limits of liability as would have applied
had the plaintiff sued it directly. For example, if the third-party
defendant’s liability to the plaintiff in the main action would
have been limited, then the doctrine of contribution will generally limit the third-party defendant’s liability to make contribution to a third-party plaintiff. Therefore, in most cases, the
limitation of liability (where applicable) will still be applied in
the context of the third-party action; hence, circumvention
would not arise. It is possible that a particular doctrine of contribution might not work in this manner and may provide for simple pro-rata apportionment of the damages between joint
tortfeasors. There would be a risk of circumvention of the limit
of liability in such a case. However, the likelihood of a carrier
seeking to rely upon the limit of liability under MC99 is exceptional, given that it is extremely difficult to prove the required
elements.
As we saw with Armavia, Chubb II, and many of the other thirdparty action cases considered in this Article, it was not the theory or limitation of liability that was at risk of circumvention; it
was the time limit or jurisdiction. Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, what is often really at issue in these cases is choice of
forum rather than circumvention per se. It is less a matter of the
appropriateness of the forum than the desire of the defendants
to secure a preferential forum if it results in lower net liability.
When it comes to the time limits for taking an action, there is
potential prejudice to carriers in checked baggage and cargo
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cases in not applying the Warsaw Convention’s time limits to
third-party actions. This is, for example, because it may deprive
them of the timely notice essential to investigate the circumstances of damages that may not have been reasonably detectable by the carrier.
If doctrines of contribution or indemnification usually permit
the carrier, as a third-party defendant, to invoke any conditions
or limits of liability that would have applied had the plaintiff to
the main action sued it directly, then why was the Second Circuit concerned about circumvention of the limit of liability in
Reed II? This comes down to the distinction between a duty to
provide contribution under common law and a duty to provide
contribution under contract, a distinction we earmarked earlier
in this Article as requiring further inspection. This is the third
point to be borne in mind when considering the gravity of the
risk of circumvention.
What can arise is that a third party sues a carrier for indemnification based on a contractual indemnity given in an agreement between the carrier and that third party (e.g., an aircraft
purchase agreement). In Reed II, the carrier’s potential liability
to indemnify its préposés arose from a presumed contractual indemnity in the employment contract.414 In such cases, because
the indemnification being sought is based on contract and not
on a common law doctrine of contribution or indemnification,
the carrier cannot rely on that doctrine to condition or limit its
liability to provide indemnification (unless the contract were to
incorporate such right expressly).
In such cases, the conditions and/or limits of liability of the
Warsaw Convention could be viewed as having been circumvented. However, it is arguable that by giving a contractual indemnity, the carrier effectively and voluntarily waives its right to
invoke the limitation of liability provided under the Warsaw
Convention. We have to ask ourselves if this amounts to circumvention of the Warsaw Convention. How is it circumvention to
hold the carrier to its freely given contractual obligations? It is
worth noting that Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention allows
the carrier to waive the limitation of liability by agreeing to a
higher sum, by special contract, with the passenger,415 and
See Reed II, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1977).
See Warsaw Convention, supra note 9, art. 22(1) (“In the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited to the sum of 125,000
francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the Court seised of the case, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital
414
415
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MC99 contains an equivalent provision.416 If it is circumvention,
then it is a circumvention the carrier is complicit in. Thus, the
legal basis for the third-party action, specifically whether it is a
cause of action ground in a contractual or non-contractual obligation, changes the complexion of the issue of circumvention.
At this point, we find ourselves knee-deep in policy. In Reed II,
the potential third-party plaintiffs were the carrier’s préposés, specifically employees.417 Clearly the Second Circuit and the international community who concluded the Hague Protocol saw
compelling policy considerations in those circumstances for extending the limit of liability to actions taken against préposés.
This was then built upon with the Guadalajara Convention and
now consolidated and modernized in MC99. Do the same or
similar policy considerations and circumstances apply to the remaining third parties outside of the Warsaw Convention, and
are they sufficiently compelling? Should third parties, such as
airframe and component manufacturers, aircraft lessors, airports, and other aviation service providers, be entitled to the
same preferential treatment as préposés? These are the kinds of
questions that the Author has addressed elsewhere.418 Here, it
suffices to say that whatever reform is necessary concerning
third-party actions for contribution or indemnification in the
context of WCS and MC99, the correct starting point for such,
the Author submits, is to accept that the correct doctrinal position is that WCS and MC99 do not apply to third-party actions
for contribution or indemnification against the carrier. Furthermore, the path to accepting this truth and finding a way to
tackle the consequences is to exorcise the baleful influence of
Reed II once and for all.
value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.”). In the carriage of goods, Article 22(2) allows the parties to agree to a
higher limit of liability by through a special declaration as to value. See id. art.
22(2); see also DRION, supra note 61, at 104 (“[S]ince the Convention does not
forbid the carrier to accept a contractual liability in excess of the Warsaw limits, it
will depend on the interpretation of the contract on which the recourse action is
founded, whether it was intended to set aside any limitation of liability provided
by the Convention.”).
416 MC99, supra note 10, art. 25 (“A carrier may stipulate that the contract of
carriage shall be subject to higher limits of liability than those provided for in this
Convention or to no limits of liability whatsoever.”).
417 Reed II, 555 F.2d at 1081.
418 For the author’s view and his proposals for possible reform, see generally
CLUXTON, supra note 47.

